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DISABLING LANGUAGE: WHY LEGAL 
TERMINOLOGY SHOULD COMPORT  
WITH A SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY 
Abstract: The disability terminology used in the law has evolved significantly 
over time. This evolution has mirrored various models for treating and perceiving 
disability in society, from the moral model of disability as a sin to the medical 
model of disability as a defect to be cured. After witnessing the success of the 
Civil Rights Movement, disability rights activists began to push for a social mod-
el of disability that reframed disability as a condition created by physical and cul-
tural barriers to inclusion rather than as an individual impairment. This activism 
led to federal legislation mandating both inclusion and inclusive language, but 
there is still work to do. Lawyers, as members of society with a special responsi-
bility for promoting justice, should implement the social model in their practice 
of law by utilizing respectful language and confronting their own underlying as-
sumptions about disability. State legislatures should make sure the social model 
is reflected in their laws by updating disability terminology to reflect the pre-
ferred language of the disability community. And the Supreme Court should 
bring the social model into the courtroom by interpreting the definition of disa-
bility more broadly to protect a wide range of people and better align with con-
gressional intent. 
INTRODUCTION 
Feebleminded, moron, mentally deficient, retarded, handicapped—these 
are words that have been used in society and the law to describe people with 
disabilities.1 These are also all words that contribute to feelings of stigmatiza-
tion and discrimination against people with disabilities.2 In the words of John 
Franklin Stephens, a Special Olympics athlete: 
So what’s wrong with “retard”? I can only tell you what it means to 
me and people like me when we hear it. It means that the rest of you 
are excluding us from your group. We are something that is not like 
you and something that none of you would ever want to be. We are 
                                                                                                                           
 1 John Simpson, What’s in a Name? The Language of Intellectual Disability, in SUPPORTING 
INDIVIDUALS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES & MENTAL ILLNESS 10, 11–13 (Sherri Melrose et al. 
eds., 2015); Patrick J. Devlieger, From Handicap to Disability: Language Use and Cultural Meaning 
in the United States, 21 DISABILITY & REHABILITATION 346, 351 (1999). 
 2 See S. REP. NO. 111-244, at 2 (2010) (discussing how each of the terms used throughout history 
has described people with disabilities in a negative way); Simpson, supra note 1, at 11–13 (highlight-
ing how a number of the terms used to describe people with disabilities have been transformed into 
everyday insults). 
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something outside the “in” group. We are someone that is not your 
kind. I want you to know that it hurts to be left out here, alone.3 
As Stephens describes, stigmatizing language like the word “retard” contrib-
utes to the marginalization of people with disabilities.4 Through statutes and 
court cases that utilized—and sometimes directly addressed—this language, 
the law has played a powerful role in the perpetuation of different models of 
perceiving and treating disability.5 The evolution of disability language can be 
traced from statutes that made it a crime to be “deformed,” to the Supreme 
Court condoning the medical sterilization of those deemed to be “feeble-
minded,” to the first laws mandating the provision of services to the “handi-
capped” that emerged out of concern for rehabilitating wounded veterans.6 Af-
ter observing the success of the Civil Rights Movement, disability rights activ-
ists began a strong push for more inclusive language in legislation that reflect-
ed a model of disability in which it is the environment, not the person or their 
individual condition, that is disabling.7 
In response to this pressure, Congress passed the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act (ADA) in 1990, a comprehensive civil rights bill for people with dis-
abilities.8 Notably, the ADA used the phrase “individuals with disabilities,” 
which is an example of person-first language that promotes inclusion and 
equality by emphasizing individuals as people first rather than defining them 
by their disability.9 This person-first language is in line with the modern social 
model of disability that views disability as a condition created by the physical 
                                                                                                                           
 3 John Franklin Stephens, Opinion, Using the Word “Retard” to Describe Me Hurts, DENVER 
POST (Aug. 31, 2008), https://www.denverpost.com/2008/08/31/using-the-word-retard-to-describe-
me-hurts/ [https://perma.cc/J6E9-CRN9]. 
 4 Lindsey T. Back et al., How We Label Students with Disabilities: A Framework of Language 
Use in an Urban School District in the United States, 36 DISABILITY STUD. Q., Fall 2016, https://dsq-
sds.org/article/view/4387/4481#top [https://perma.cc/FCP4-Q2Y2]. 
 5 See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of 
Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1344 
(1993) (highlighting how the law has historically treated individuals with disabilities as “intrinsically 
sub-standard”). 
 6 Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-113, 57 Stat. 374; Buck v. 
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1926); SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC 1 
(2009). 
 7 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 428–29 
(2000); Dana S. Dunn & Erin E. Andrews, Person-First and Identity-First Language: Developing 
Psychologists’ Cultural Competence Using Disability Language, 70 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 255, 258 
(2015); Vlad Perju, Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction of Disability in the Eu-
ropean Union and the United States, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 279, 294 (2011). 
 8 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)); FRED PELKA, WHAT WE HAVE DONE 28–29 (2012); 
Kathlyn L. Reed, History of Federal Legislation for Persons with Disabilities, 46 AM. J. OCCUPA-
TIONAL THERAPY 397, 404 (1992). 
 9 42 U.S.C. § 12112; Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 256; Back et al., supra note 4, at 4–5.  
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and cultural barriers of society rather than an individual trait.10 Utilizing per-
son-first language in the ADA was a deliberate effort by Congress to respect 
the preferences of people with disabilities and avoid stereotypes or stigmatiz-
ing labels.11 Subsequently, in 2010, President Barack Obama signed Rosa’s 
Law, which mandated that “mental retardation” be replaced with person-first 
language in numerous federal laws.12 
As exemplified by this history of disability terminology, the way lan-
guage is utilized in the law can have powerful implications.13 Terminology and 
labels attach connotations and perceptions to the people they describe, and the 
imposition of a label is an exercise of authority that determines who is outside 
the norm.14 The law is built upon spoken and written word and has the ability 
to institutionalize language and the norms that it connotes.15 Disability termi-
nology as used in the law can influence the way people with disabilities are 
viewed and view themselves, and can lead to marginalization and exclusion 
when associated with negative connotations.16 Furthermore, defining certain 
legal terminology can have drastic implications for who may qualify for ser-
vices and protections provided under laws like the ADA.17 When the Supreme 
Court interpreted the ADA in 1999, it took a formalist approach—a strict ad-
herence to precedent and legal terminology—and significantly narrowed the 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 428–29 (describing how the social model treats disability as 
arising from society and the environment rather than from an individual’s mental or physical condi-
tion); Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 258 (discussing how language that emphasizes the person 
over their condition is more in line with a social model of disability that also shifts the “problem” of 
disability from the person to society). 
 11 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 332–33 (1990) (addressing the change in terminology from 
“handicap” to “disability” and explaining the reasons behind it, including the fact that “the choice of 
terms to apply to a person with a disability is overlaid with stereotypes, patronizing attitudes, and 
other emotional connotations”). 
 12 Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643, 2643 (2010) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of the U.S.C.); Marty Ford et al., Beyond Terminology: The Policy Impact of a Grass-
roots Movement, 51 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 108, 109 (2013). 
 13 WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS & ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER, AND POWER 8 (1971); Tom 
Shakespeare, Disability, Identity, and Difference, in EXPLORING THE DIVIDE 94, 105 (Colin Barnes & 
Geoff Mercer eds., 1996); Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do with It or 
an Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 433 (2011); Rose 
Galvin, The Making of the Disabled Identity: A Linguistic Analysis of Marginalisation, 23 DISABILITY 
STUD. Q., No. 2, 2003, https://dsq-sds.org/article/view/421/589 [https://perma.cc/H9GS-PT7T]. 
 14 Wendy Atkins-Sayre, Naming Women: The Emergence of “Ms.” as a Liberatory Title, 28 
WOMEN & LANGUAGE 8, 9 (2005); Devlieger, supra note 1, at 346; Irving Kenneth Zola, Self, Identi-
ty, and the Naming Question: Reflections on the Language of Disability, 36 SOC. SCI. & MED. 167, 
167 (1993); Galvin, supra note 13. 
 15 CHAMBLISS & SEIDMAN, supra note 13, at 8; Kanter, supra note 13, at 433–34. 
 16 Shakespeare, supra note 13, at 105; Zola, supra note 14, at 169; see CHAMBLISS & SEIDMAN, 
supra note 13, at 13 (describing the role-defining power of the law). 
 17 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (forbidding discrimination against an individual based on disa-
bility); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481 (1999) (deciding whether plaintiffs qualify 
as individuals with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)). 
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definition of disability, thereby excluding a number of individuals from protec-
tion under the law.18 In order to align itself with the disability rights movement 
and the preferences of disability advocates, the social model of disability 
should be reflected in the terminology used by legal practitioners, in state stat-
utes, and by the Supreme Court.19 
Part I of this Note traces the history of disability terminology and the role 
of the law in its evolution.20 Part II discusses the intricate relationship between 
language, disability, law, and power.21 This Part also explains the most recent 
iterations of disability terminology.22 Because of the important role social, leg-
islative, and judicial application of disability terminology and definitions have 
played throughout history, Part III recommends that the social model of disa-
bility be reflected in three different legal spaces: the individual practice of the 
law, state legislation, and the Supreme Court’s judicial interpretation of the 
definition of disability under the ADA.23 
I. TRACING THE HISTORY OF THE LANGUAGE OF DISABILITY 
The stigmatizing language used to label and describe individuals with 
disabilities has historically emphasized inferiority and otherness.24 In the Unit-
ed States, the law has played a prominent role in determining how society both 
talks about and treats individuals with disabilities.25 Section A of this Part dis-
cusses the variety of ways individuals with disabilities were excluded from 
society during the nineteenth and twentieth century and traces the rise of medi-
                                                                                                                           
 18 CHRISTOPHER HUTTON, LANGUAGE, MEANING, AND THE LAW 10 (2009); Perju, supra note 7, 
at 313–15 (addressing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “disability” to exclude individuals for 
whom corrective measures minimize the impact of their disability, those who cannot show that their 
disability impacts a “major life activity,” and others). 
 19 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (instructing courts to interpret the definition of “disability” broad-
ly in order to extend protection to those that have been excluded from society because of institutional 
and societal barriers); S. REP. NO. 111-244, at 3 (in the context of Rosa’s Law, discussing the im-
portance of legislative language reflecting a view of people with disabilities as deserving of equality 
and inclusion in society); Kanter, supra note 13, at 468–69 (discussing the critical need for lawyers to 
understand how to represent clients with disabilities respectfully and effectively). 
 20 See infra notes 24–152 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 154–209 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 210–221 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 222–279 and accompanying text. 
 24 Devlieger, supra note 1, at 351. Using the term “idiots” to refer to people with intellectual 
disabilities and mark them as inferior dates as far back as ancient Greece. David Ferleger, Disabilities 
and the Law: The Evolution of Independence, FED. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 26, 27. Similar language use 
throughout history has emphasized marginalization and dehumanization, and individuals with disabili-
ties have been treated as second-class citizens. Drimmer, supra note 5, at 1342–43; Back et al., supra 
note 4, at 3. 
 25 See Drimmer, supra note 5, at 1342–44 (noting that the law and society have treated individu-
als with disabilities as second-class citizens). Even laws that were designed to create more rights for 
people with disabilities tend to describe the people as flawed. Id. at 1344. 
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cal and moral models of disability.26 Section B documents how the return of 
injured World War I veterans led to a focus on rehabilitation, as well as the 
persistence of the medical model and the creation of the clinical term “retard-
ed.”27 Section C chronicles how the rise of the Civil Rights Movement and the 
concurrent disability rights movement led to a push for inclusive legislation 
and language, culminating in the passage of the ADA.28 Section D discusses 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA and Congress’s response to the 
judicial narrowing of the definition of disability.29 
A. “We Didn’t Have No Freedom, We Didn’t Have No Rights at All”:  
The Societal Exclusion of Individuals with Disabilities  
and the Rise of the Moral and Medical Models30 
Starting in the late 1800s, major cities across the country passed laws that 
made it illegal for any person who had a physical disability to appear in pub-
lic.31 These laws were often referred to as “ugly laws” because of the offensive 
language they used to describe people with disabilities as less than human, 
such as persons “in any way deformed so as to be an unsightly or disgusting 
object.”32 The ugly laws reflected the push at the time to keep individuals with 
disabilities segregated from larger society, often through forced institutionali-
zation in separate facilities.33 The language used in ugly laws—“diseased, 
maimed, mutilated”—highlights the dehumanizing view of people with disa-
bilities prevalent at the time.34 Although the ugly laws refer to “any person,” 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See infra notes 31–60 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 62–81 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 83–129 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 131–152 and accompanying text. 
 30 This Note argues in large part that the voices of individuals with disabilities need to be heard in 
society, in the courts, and in their legal representation. See infra notes 222–279 and accompanying 
text. To that end, many of the headings include quotes from individuals with disabilities who lived 
through the history being chronicled throughout this Note. These quotes are pulled from Fred Pelka’s 
What We Have Done: An Oral History of the Disability Rights Movement, which aims to tell the story 
of the disability rights movement “in the words of those who drew up that agenda, engaged that envi-
ronment, and forever transformed our society.” PELKA, supra note 8, at 29. This first quote comes 
from Terry Schwartz, who describes his time at the Fairview Training Center in Oregon. Institutions, 
Part 1, in WHAT WE HAVE DONE, supra note 8, at 48, 57–58. 
 31 SCHWEIK, supra note 6, at 1; Ferleger, supra note 24, at 28. 
 32 SCHWEIK, supra note 6, at 4; Ferleger, supra note 24, at 28. Many states had “ugly laws” in 
place until the 1970s. Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 441; Ferleger, supra note 24, at 28. 
 33 See Ferleger, supra note 24, at 28 (stating that the “ugly laws” were further evidence of an “out 
of sight, out of mind” approach to treating people with disabilities). Institutionalization was also a 
result of the belief that individuals with disabilities should not interact with people without disabili-
ties. S. REP. NO. 111-244, at 2. 
 34 SCHWEIK, supra note 6, at 85, 89, 94. 
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they utilize terms of disgust that immutably tie that person to an identity of 
being diseased, maimed, mutilated, or deformed.35 
The description of disability as a defect or deformity led to the rise of the 
medical model in the nineteenth century that considered disability a medical 
problem to be cured.36 The medical model regarded disability as a problem that 
is inherent in the individual and that should be fixed through medical treat-
ment.37 “Feeble-minded” became the first widely used term arising out of the 
medical model for individuals with intellectual disabilities in the United States, 
and was used to refer to individuals collectively (“the feeble-minded”).38 “Im-
becile” and “idiot” were also used as further clinical classifications of “feeble-
mindedness.”39  
Religious doctrines led to the concurrent moral model of disability that 
emphasized inferiority and pity, resulting in derogatory terms that portrayed 
disability as the result of sin or requiring charity.40 Individuals characterized as 
“feeble-minded” were associated with a group considered to be the root cause 
of societal evils, including crime, sexual deviancy, and poverty.41 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id. at 85, 94. By describing individuals with disabilities as persons “who are” rather than per-
sons “with,” the language of the laws further binds the person to these characteristics deemed unpleas-
ant and disgusting. Id. at 85. 
 36 Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 258. 
 37 Laura Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1048 (2004). Under 
the medical model, being able-bodied is seen as the norm, and a failure to cure disability is seen as a 
failure of medicine and science. PELKA, supra note 8, at 8. 
 38 Simpson, supra note 1, at 11; see Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 258 (describing that the 
medical model refers to people by and as their conditions, such as when a doctor asks if someone has 
treated “the spinal cord injury in room 330”). 
 39 Simpson, supra note 1, at 11. 
 40 Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 258. The moral model has roots in many religious traditions, 
including Judaism and Christianity. Marno Retief & Rantoa Letšosa, Models of Disability: A Brief 
Overview, 74 HTC THEOLOGICAL STUD. 1, 2 (2018). In these doctrines, disability was sometimes 
seen as a blessing worthy of protection of the gods, but more often, disability was viewed as a pun-
ishment from god or a possession by demons, and therefore was equated with sin. PELKA, supra note 
8, at 5; Retief & Letšosa, supra, at 2. Often the ability to cure disability was seen as an expression of 
spiritual power. PELKA, supra note 8, at 5. This idea that disability or illness is the result of individual 
sin has been taken to its extreme throughout history, including a once-common notion that masturba-
tion caused blindness or that AIDS was a punishment for homosexuality and drug use. Id. at 6. In fact, 
Congressman Tony Coelho, one of the key legislators to push for the ADA in 1989, spoke at commit-
tee hearings for the ADA about his own experience with disability and religion. JONATHAN M. 
YOUNG, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 87–
88 (2d ed. 2010). Congressman Coelho was diagnosed with epilepsy when he was in college, and 
because of a belief that epilepsy was evidence of a demonic possession he was forbidden from the 
Catholic priesthood he was pursuing and exiled from his family. Id. at 87. He subsequently began a 
career in government and as a Democratic representative was at the forefront of pushing for inclusive 
legislation for people with disabilities. Id. at 39, 88. 
 41 Mark Jackson, ‘It Begins with the Goose and Ends with the Goose’: Medical, Legal, and Lay 
Understandings of Imbecility in Ingram v. Wyatt, 1824–1832, 11 SOC. HIST. MED. 361, 364 (1998). 
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The eugenics movement reflected this societal fear that “normal” individ-
uals would eventually become outnumbered by this “deviant” group.42 In 
1926, the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell upheld the constitutionality of state-
mandated sterilization of individuals deemed “feeble-minded” in order to erad-
icate the perceived dangers posed by this group.43 The lawyers on both sides of 
Buck are suspected to have brought the case specifically to uphold the steriliza-
tion laws.44 In his majority opinion, Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes utilized 
language like “socially inadequate” and “defective offspring” that emphasized 
a perception of individuals with disabilities as inferior and a threat to society to 
legitimize the Court’s holding that stripped them of their right to reproduce.45 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Kanter, supra note 13, at 437. The pervasive belief at this time was that conditions such as 
mental illness were passed down from generation to generation. ROBERT HENLEY WOODY, LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION: A SEARCH FOR RELIABILITY 68 (1974) (citing Elyce Zenoff 
Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit—Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591 (1966)). Therefore, 
preventing the inheritance of these traits was considered the only way to protect society from being 
inundated by those considered defective. Id. 
 43 274 U.S. at 207; Jackson, supra note 41, at 364. The case challenged the involuntary steriliza-
tion of eighteen-year-old Carrie Buck in Virginia, described as “a feeble-minded white woman,” who 
lived with her mother and illegitimate child in a Virginia institution. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205. Carrie 
became pregnant after being raped while in foster care. PELKA, supra note 8, at 2. Carrie’s mother had 
been taken to the Virginia Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-minded (“the Colony”) when she was 
forty-eight years old after being diagnosed with “mental deficiency.” PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE 
GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES 106 (2008). She had been arrested for prostitution, showed evidence of 
illicit drug use, and was described as lacking “moral sense and responsibility,” but she did not demon-
strate any actual signs of a mental disability. Id. After her pregnancy, Carrie’s foster parents had her 
placed at the Colony with her birth mother. Id. at 103. 
 44 Verdict of History: The Forgotten Years: 1870–1940, MICH. B.J., Jan. 2009, at 12. There was 
little evidence that Carrie’s family met the clinical definition of “feeble-minded.” Id. Her foster par-
ents described her as “peculiar,” subject to hallucinations, and prone to temper tantrums, but otherwise 
as in good health and well-behaved. LOMBARDO, supra note 43, at 103. She had an I.Q. of 56. Id. at 
105. Dr. Albert S. Priddy, director of the Colony and a strong proponent of the eugenics movement, 
reported finding that Carrie showed no evidence of psychosis but described her as “a moral delin-
quent.” Id. at 60, 107. After Dr. Priddy presented evidence that both Carrie and her mother demon-
strated the same deviant characteristics, the Colony Board voted to sterilize Carrie to promote societal 
welfare. Id. at 107. To uphold this vote, the Board was required to appoint an attorney to represent 
Carrie against the Colony’s lawyer, Aubrey Strode. Id. The lawyer the Colony appointed was Irving 
Whitehead, a friend of both Priddy and Strode, a former director of the Colony, and an advocate for 
the eugenics movement. Id. At the initial trial, Strode introduced testimony of Carrie’s teachers, social 
workers, neighbors, and nurses who testified negatively about the “peculiarity” of various members of 
the Buck family while offering very little evidence about Carrie herself. Id. at 113–16. Whitehead let 
inaccurate statements about the Buck family go undisputed, raised no strong challenges to any of this 
evidence, and did not cross-examine many of the witnesses. Id. at 138–39. Strode introduced into 
evidence the deposition testimony of a prominent eugenics expert stating that the “social and econom-
ic inadequacy” and record of “immorality, prostitution, and untruthfulness” of Carrie and her family 
presented a risk to society, and that sterilization offered a solution to “prevent race degeneracy.” Id. at 
134–35. Whitehead made one objection—that the deposition be struck from the trial record—but was 
overruled, and he offered no witnesses or evidence in opposition to Carrie’s sterilization. Id. at 135. 
 45 See Buck, 274 U.S. at 205–07 (using terms such as “feeble-minded,” “mental defectives,” and 
“imbecility” to describe people with disabilities). The language used in the opinion also perpetuated 
an idea that individuals with disabilities were not viewed as fully human and therefore should be erad-
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The language of the case mirrored the pervasive societal fear that gave rise to 
the eugenics movement in the United States.46 After Buck, over sixty thousand 
individuals were involuntarily sterilized across the country.47 
Towards the middle of the twentieth century, the medical field began to 
use “mental deficiency” and “mental defectiveness” due to negative connota-
tions that were associated with the term “feeble-minded.”48 Although it ap-
peared that the medical terminology was evolving, the term “moron” arose out 
of the eugenics movement and persisted in colloquial use.49 This kind of lan-
guage reflected a belief that individuals with disabilities were lacking or dam-
aged and could not be cured, and therefore still relegated them to the margins 
of society.50 The Supreme Court used the terms “mentally defective” and 
“moron” in cases from the 1940s through the 1960s and issued decisions that 
largely reflected a perception of individuals with disabilities as deficient.51 The 
laws in question in these cases were often as ostracizing to people with disabil-
ities as the language used within them, including the Immigration Act of 1917, 
which prohibited people who were deemed to be “mentally defective” from 
being admitted to the United States.52 
                                                                                                                           
icated from society. See id. at 207 (describing people with disabilities as “degenerates” who should 
not be allowed to reproduce because their offspring will most likely starve or be executed for commit-
ting a crime). 
 46 See Verdict of History: The Forgotten Years: 1870–1940, supra note 44, at 10, 12 (describing 
the impact of legal decisions upholding sterilization laws to stop the perpetuation of a “low and de-
generate race”). 
 47 Id. at 12. Twenty states passed sterilization laws that largely mirrored the Virginia Law upheld 
in Buck. MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW: THE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 184 (Frank T. Lindman & Donald M. McIntyre eds., 1961). 
Many offered little to no procedural protections to patients, and only two states statutorily required the 
consent of the patient. Id. at 184–85. 
 48 Simpson, supra note 1, at 12. 
 49 Dan Berry, Giving a Name, and Dignity, to a Disability, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/sunday-review/giving-a-name-and-dignity-to-a-disability.html [https://
perma.cc/V83D-PJXF]. A leading eugenicist, Henry H. Goddard, came up with the term by using the 
Greek word for “dull.” Id. 
 50 See Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 258 (stating that terms like “moron” perpetuated an idea 
that individuals with disabilities were inferior to the rest of society). An American Bar Association 
report from 1961 highlights that the generally agreed-upon view of the time was that mental deficien-
cy was a condition that could not be cured. MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 47, at 
186. 
 51 See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 620, 635 (1961) (overturning the conviction of 
plaintiff, a “thirty-three-year-old mental defective of the moron class,” because given his disability, 
his confession could not be said to be a willing admission of guilt); United States ex. rel. Johnson v. 
Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806, 808, 815 (1949) (remanding a decision by the Immigration and National-
ization Service denying petitioner admission to the United States because there was inadequate evi-
dence to find her “mentally defective” rather than “normal”). 
 52 See Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. at 808 (interpreting the Immigration Act to determine whether 
denying admission to the plaintiff was inappropriate because of her status as “mentally defective”). A 
connection could be drawn between the prevalent xenophobia of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
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This view that people with disabilities were not capable of living among 
larger society or making decisions led to the rise of institutionalization across the 
country.53 While some in the 1800s believed that individuals with disabilities 
could grow and develop if provided with education and accommodations, a 
growing perception of people with disabilities as dangerous shifted the goals of 
institutions away from education and toward simply custodial care.54 These insti-
tutions were referred to as asylums and their purpose was to maintain social or-
der by segregating people with disabilities rather than providing them with any 
sort of meaningful services.55 Despite growing public unrest with the dehuman-
izing conditions of asylums across the country, the legal profession remained 
largely unconcerned with addressing these problems.56 Individuals who were 
institutionalized and then released often returned to public life only to find that 
they had lost a number of their civil rights, including property and custody 
rights.57 
                                                                                                                           
eth centuries and the rise of the eugenics movement, as individuals outside the norm were seen as a 
threat to larger society. PELKA, supra note 8, at 9. 
 53 Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, PSYCHIATRY, Oct. 2010, 
at 30, 32 (2010). The first four asylums in the United States were founded in Connecticut, Massachu-
setts, New York, and Pennsylvania in the early 1800s. Id. These original institutions were privately 
funded, but soon there was a network of public, state-funded mental institutions across the country. Id. 
In 1953, an all-time high of 559,000 people were living in institutions in the United States. Id. 
 54 Ferleger, supra note 24, at 27–28. Examples of custodial care included restraining patients or 
sedating them with medicine or experimental drugs, including opium. Testa & West, supra note 53, at 
32. While care of this type was the norm in the nineteenth century, a few individuals were ahead of 
their time in pushing for proper education for children with disabilities. Hilary Rodham Clinton & 
Chelsea Clinton, Margaret Bancroft, in THE BOOK OF GUTSY WOMEN 58, 59 (2019). Margaret Ban-
croft was one of the earliest disability advocates, and quit her job as a teacher to found the Had-
donfield Training School in 1883. Id. The school provided holistic education and care to its students, 
with a focus on “nutrition, exercise, and sensory and artistic instruction.” Id. While most people held 
the belief that individuals with disabilities should be hidden away from larger society, Bancroft took 
her students on field trips and taught them important life and job skills. Id. She trained teachers to take 
these practices to other parts of the country and encouraged the medical field to be more inclusive and 
individualized when it came to treating individuals with disabilities. Id. at 60. Bancroft also actively 
pushed to end the use of derogatory terms like “idiot” and “imbecile.” Id. Her school, reincorporated 
as the Bancroft Training School in 1898, is now a large nonprofit that continues to provide services to 
children and adults with disabilities across Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Id.; History, 
BANCROFT, https://www.bancroft.org/about/history/ [https://perma.cc/Z68X-F9RL]. 
 55 Testa & West, supra note 53, at 32. 
 56 David Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 595–96 
(1983). From 1950 to 1955, no more than twenty-eight law journal articles discussed intellectual disa-
bilities in a given year, reflecting the lack of attention from the legal profession to the issue of disabil-
ity and institutionalization. Id. at 596 n.4. 
 57 Testa & West, supra note 53, at 32. Elizabeth Packard is one example of how institutionaliza-
tion was accompanied by a loss of countless other civil rights. Id. Elizabeth was institutionalized in 
1860 because her husband, a clergyman, wanted to punish her for “having an unclean spirit.” Id. At 
the time, all that was required to involuntarily institutionalize someone was a mental illness diagnosis 
of some kind and a recommendation for treatment; this was based on the idea that it was the govern-
ment’s obligation to treat such individuals, even against their will. Id. Elizabeth was officially labeled 
as having “moral insanity” and spent three years in an institution. Id. When she was released, she 
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It was not until the twentieth century that the public’s condemnation of the 
abuses of institutionalization manifested as actual improvements to the sys-
tem.58 States implemented legal protections for individuals being considered 
for commitment to an institutionalization.59 These protections included the 
right to a trial and legal representation prior to commitment, and the judiciary 
undertook responsibility for the decision of whether to commit someone, large-
ly removing that power from the medical profession.60 
B. “If It’s Rehab, Surely at Some Point You’re Rehabilitated!”: The  
Push for Rehabilitation, the Introduction of “Retardation,”  
and the Persistence of the Medical Model61 
The rehabilitative model evolved from the medical model and positioned 
disability as a condition that can be mitigated or even cured by the provision of 
therapies or accommodations.62 Support for providing vocational trainings and 
services to people with physical disabilities arose out of a desire to help veter-
ans returning home after World War I.63 The rehabilitative model, like the med-
ical model, focused on “fixing” the individual, often with the goal of getting 
that person back to work.64 In the early twentieth century, many states imple-
mented workers’ compensation schemes to provide income to employees who 
became disabled after workplace accidents.65 Proof of disability was required 
to be eligible for workers’ compensation, but doctors made such determina-
tions based on a value judgment of who they felt was deserving of such com-
pensation rather than on objective medical standards.66 
In 1918, Congress passed the Soldiers (Veterans) Rehabilitation Act to 
provide vocational services to veterans; it later extended the same provisions to 
civilians with physical disabilities with the passage of the Smith-Fess Act in 
1920.67 In 1943, Congress amended the Smith-Fess Act to expand the defini-
                                                                                                                           
found that she had legally lost custody of her children and had lost her property rights. Id. She subse-
quently filed and won a lawsuit for wrongful confinement. Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Institutions, Part 2, in WHAT WE HAVE DONE, supra note 8, at 77, 86. Lucy Gwin describes 
her time in a rehabilitative facility after she suffered a traumatic brain injury in a car accident. Id. at 
82–83. 
 62 Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 258. 
 63 Reed, supra note 8, at 398; Rovner, supra note 37, at 1048. 
 64 Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 258; Rovner, supra note 37, at 1049. 
 65 PELKA, supra note 8, at 12. Workers’ compensation became a necessity as industrialization led 
to an increasing number of employees becoming disabled because of injuries at work. Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Reed, supra note 8, at 398–99; see Smith-Fess Act, ch. 219, Pub. L. No. 66-236, 41 Stat. 735 
(1920) (providing vocational services to individuals “disabled in industry”); Vocational Rehabilitation 
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tion of “vocational services,” and for the first time medical, educational, and 
vocational services for both physical and intellectual disability, as well as 
blindness and psychiatric illness, were covered under the law.68 These laws 
continued to fixate on work-related skills and education, and therefore still re-
flected dominant stereotypes about disability as an inferior status that leads to 
negative economic effects for the entire nation.69 
The 1943 Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments also introduced the 
term “handicap” to the law.70 The word originated in nineteenth century sports 
as a method to equalize the playing field by imposing an advantage or disad-
vantage, and it was later used to describe an encumbrance or impediment.71 
Throughout the twentieth century, it became one of the most common words 
used in both society and the law to refer to mental or physical disability both as 
an identifying status and as an obstacle that creates difficulty.72 
In 1961, what was then known as the American Association on Mental 
Deficiency issued guidelines proposing use of the terms “mild, moderate, se-
vere, and profound mental retardation” to classify individuals with intellectual 
disabilities.73 The term “mental retardation” was clinically defined as a condi-
                                                                                                                           
Act of 1918, ch. 107, § 2, 40 Stat. 617 (providing vocational services and compensation to individuals 
disabled after discharge from the military). 
 68 Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-113, 57 Stat. 374; Reed, 
supra note 8, at 400. 
 69 Drimmer, supra note 5, at 1371. The goals of rehabilitation were to cure the aspects of individ-
uals with disabilities that made them inferior, including their perceived inability to contribute econom-
ically to the country. Id. These policies did not help to reduce stigma or discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities, as the only employment opportunities for people with disabilities were often 
in segregated, sheltered workshops. Id. at 1369, 1371. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was one 
example during this time of the negative stigma that attached to disability. PELKA, supra note 8, at 
17–18. A polio survivor, Roosevelt went to extreme lengths to hide the fact that he used a wheelchair 
and had ramps installed at the White House because he feared his disability would hinder his chances 
of being reelected. Id. at 18. 
 70 Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1943 at 379. 
 71 Handicap, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2013), https://www-oed-com.proxy.bc.edu/
view/Entry/83859?rskey=AnvwGl&result=1&isAdvanced=false [https://perma.cc/34XW-PJUX]. 
 72 See id. (showing that the word “handicap” was used in 1888 to describe the “handicap of deaf-
ness” and continued to be used in this way throughout the next century); see, e.g., Education of the 
Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121, 123 (1970) (providing free public education for 
children who are physically or mentally “handicapped” and require special education); Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1943 at 376, 378 (using “handicap” in phrases like “handicapped 
individuals” as well as mentioning a physical condition that may create “substantial handicap to em-
ployment”). 
 73 Simpson, supra note 1, at 12. The American Association on Mental Deficiency is now known 
as the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. Marc J. Tassé & Mat-
thew Grover, American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, in ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS 122, 124 (F. R. Volkmar ed. 2013). As a professional organi-
zation dedicated to research and support for people with intellectual disabilities, the name of the Asso-
ciation has acted as an indicator of public perception of attitudes towards people with intellectual 
disabilities. Id. at 123. The Association changed from The American Association for the Study of the 
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tion with diminished cognitive capacity and functioning, though critics argued 
that the term was too ambiguous and lacked a consistent definition.74 The term 
came about at the same time as the law recognized a more comprehensive view 
of rehabilitation for people with disabilities that went beyond just job place-
ment and included improvement in day-to-day life.75 The Vocational Rehabili-
tation Act was amended again in 1965 to further expand the provision and in-
crease the quality of services and facilities for the “mentally retarded.”76 
Although it originated as a neutral clinical term, “mental retardation” 
quickly developed a broader social meaning that classified individuals with 
intellectual disabilities as outside of the norm.77 It also became a commonly 
used slur for a person with or without a disability considered to be stupid or 
dumb, which reinforced negative stereotypes of people with disabilities.78 The 
pejorative use of the word first appeared in 1954 in the novel The Courts of 
Memory when one of the main characters stated, “you’ve got an I.Q. about 
equal to a squirrel’s. You’re retarded, do you hear me?”79 Similarly negative 
uses of the term, and the suffix “-tard,” became and remained popular in the 
                                                                                                                           
Feebleminded to the American Association on Mental Deficiency in 1933, and in 1987 changed its 
name to The American Association on Mental Retardation. Id. at 123–24. 
 74 S. REP. NO. 111-244, at 2; WOODY, supra note 42, at 14. In 1968, the American Psychiatric 
Association defined mental retardation as “subnormal general intellectual functioning” that an indi-
vidual is born with and that leads to difficulty with learning, social skills, and development. WOODY, 
supra note 42, at 13. This definition focused both on intellectual functioning as well as behavioral 
manifestations of people with mental retardation. Id. at 13–14. Under this clinical perspective, mental 
retardation was a diagnosis made by medical professionals after testing with standardized measures. 
Steven Taylor, Before It Had a Name: Exploring the Historical Roots of Disability Studies in Educa-
tion, in VITAL QUESTIONS FACING DISABILITY STUDIES IN EDUCATION, at xiii, xiv–xv (Scot Danforth 
& Susan L. Gabel eds., 2d ed. 2016). The ambiguity in the definition of—and diagnostic criteria for—
mental retardation, however, often frustrated medical professionals and could have drastic implica-
tions for the individuals being diagnosed. WOODY, supra note 42, at 15–16. 
 75 Reed, supra note 8, at 401. Improving the social rehabilitation of people with disabilities would 
decrease the need for institutional care. Id. 
 76 Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-333, 79 Stat. 1282 (repealed 1973); 
Reed, supra note 8, at 401. Being diagnosed as “mentally retarded” granted access to treatment but 
could also have negative legal consequences, such as the loss of the right to enter into contracts. 
WOODY, supra note 42, at 58, 67. The loss of the right to enter into contracts meant that people diag-
nosed as mentally retarded often could not get married, and some states passed laws specifically for-
bidding it. Id. at 67. 
 77 Taylor, supra note 74, at xv; see Simpson, supra note 1, at 12 (stating that to a large extent, the 
idea of “mental retardation” is the result of socially constructed ideas about what constitutes normal or 
acceptable intellectual functioning). 
 78 S. REP. NO. 111-244, at 2; Simpson, supra note 1, at 12. 
 79 Mark Peters, The R-Word and the Challenging History of Words for Dummies, BOS. GLOBE 
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2017/03/06/the-word-and-challenging-history-
words-for-dummies/6heGdgEkMRaUw4MPYVF6yN/story.html [https://perma.cc/6B3C-RW3N]. 
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public lexicon.80 Despite its negative connotations, “retardation” remained the 
most commonly used term for an intellectual disability for decades.81 
C. “Basically, We Were a Galvanizing Force, Working to Get People  
at the Grassroots Level Involved”: The Rise of the Social  
Model of Disability and the Push for Inclusion82 
As the Civil Rights Movement gained traction in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, a concurrent disability rights movement was born.83 The 
disability rights movement pushed back against the medical model of disabil-
ity, which focused on treatment, charity, and public assistance as ways to miti-
gate the “problem” of disability.84 It instead promoted a social model of disa-
bility, which shifted the focus from the individual and his or her specific condi-
tions to the social barriers preventing those with disabilities from full inclusion 
in society.85 Scholars under the social rights model argue that although people 
with disabilities have vastly different conditions and experiences, they make 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. 
 81 See id. (positing that part of the reason why the word “retarded” gained such a negative conno-
tation is because its clinical use and lay use overlapped for so long). 
 82 Activists and Organizers, Part 1, in WHAT WE HAVE DONE, supra note 8, at 151, 159. Gary 
Olsen is a Deaf man who in the 1960s worked with the National Association of the Deaf to engage 
other young people in the push for inclusion. Id. at 157. 
 83 See Drimmer, supra note 5, at 1375 (emphasizing that the push for racial and gender equality 
led to a growing belief that people with disabilities similarly had a right to the equal access to society 
that they had been denied throughout history); Perju, supra note 7, at 291 (discussing how the disabil-
ity advocacy movement emerged in the 1960s). Discrimination against people with disabilities often 
occurs concurrently with discrimination against other minority groups because similar ideas of defi-
ciency and deviancy have been applied to women, racial minorities, and immigrants. PELKA, supra 
note 8, at 10. John W. Davis, one of the attorneys arguing on behalf of the Board of Education of 
Topeka, Kansas in the landmark 1954 civil rights case Brown v. Board of Education, made an argu-
ment before the Supreme Court that if states stop classifying people on the basis of race, then they will 
also have to stop doing so on the basis of sex, age, or “mental capacity.” Id. at 1; see Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that “separate but equal” facilities for educating black and 
white students violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the law). This 
argument showed the marginalized status held by people with disabilities, as Davis tried to scare the 
Court with the idea that “idiots” or “imbeciles” would be educated alongside all other students if seg-
regation is deemed unconstitutional. PELKA, supra note 8, at 2. Thurgood Marshall, arguing on behalf 
of black students, responded by contending that all the individual rights of minorities, including indi-
viduals with disabilities, are to be tested by the legal standards determined by the Court. Id. at 3. 
Many advocates for civil rights argued vehemently that racial minorities or women do not have any of 
the flaws associated with people with disabilities, further solidifying the idea that at the very least, it is 
acceptable for society to discriminate against the individuals who do. Id. at 10. 
 84 Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 427. 
 85 Id. at 428–29. The social model shifts focus away from disability as a moral failure to be pitied 
or a medical impairment to be cured, and deems society, not the person or their condition, the main 
obstacle to inclusion. Id. at 429–30; Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 258. A similar model, the 
socio-political model of disability, views disability as the interaction between both the innate physical 
or mental condition of the individual and the social environment in which they exist. Rovner, supra 
note 37, at 1051–52. 
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up an identifiable group who share the defining characteristics of societal ex-
clusion, systematic disadvantage, and lack of opportunity.86 Under this view, 
disability is not the “unfortunate result of a defective body” but rather the re-
sult of an environment created without a range of abilities in mind.87 This can 
include physical barriers to access inherent in infrastructure as well as preju-
dice, discrimination, and fear towards people with disabilities.88 The social 
model thus changed the role of people with disabilities in society from passive 
recipients of sympathy and rehabilitation to active rights holders entitled to, 
and empowered to demand, access to society.89 With the passage of progres-
sive legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, people with disabilities saw potential for full inclusion into society.90 
In 1971, the United Nations issued a “Declaration on the Rights of Men-
tally Retarded Persons” that laid out seven rights for people with disabilities 
and explicitly affirmed that they are entitled to the same rights enjoyed by all 
other members of society.91 A mental retardation diagnosis was also key to eli-
gibility for services increasingly available under state and federal legislation 
that focused on removing barriers to basic human rights.92 The Architectural 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 401. 
 87 Rovner, supra note 37, at 1052. 
 88 Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 258. Societal barriers against people with disabilities can 
take many forms, including both outright animus as well as over-generalizations that cause people to 
make assumptions about what an individual can or cannot do. Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 422–24. 
Some highlighted examples presented to Congress during debate on the ADA included a New Jersey 
zoo that refused to admit children with Down Syndrome because it thought they would upset the 
chimpanzees, and a woman who was removed from an auction event after staff decided she was “dis-
gusting to look at.” Id. Furthermore, the history of isolation and segregation of people with disabilities 
for most of American history means that American society was built without them in mind. Id. at 439–
40. This is evident in every facet of the infrastructure and architecture of the United States: for exam-
ple, the existence of telephones assumes that everyone can speak and hear, streets lack curb cuts for 
people who use wheelchairs, and public transit systems without ramps or elevators are completely 
inaccessible to anyone but the able-bodied. PELKA, supra note 8, at 17; Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 
440. 
 89 Perju, supra note 7, at 284. 
 90 Drimmer, supra note 5, at 1376. The disability rights movement adopted the strategies and 
tactics of the Civil Rights movement in its fight for greater inclusion. PELKA, supra note 8, at 26. The 
disability rights movement began on college campuses in the 1960s, as students with disabilities who 
were finally given access to education pushed for accommodations on their campuses. Perju, supra 
note 7, at 291. 
 91 WOODY, supra note 42, at 46. This declaration included the right to medical care, education, 
economic security, satisfactory standards of living, and due process of the law. Id. It also stated that to 
the greatest extent possible, “the mentally retarded person” should live with family or relatives and 
has a right to a qualified guardian. Id. Finally, the declaration stated that should the rights of people 
with disabilities need to be restricted, proper procedural and legal safeguards must be utilized. Id. at 
47. The declaration motivated legal actions seeking to uphold a number of these rights. Id. 
 92 Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to 
the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 116, 120 (2007). The 
term was also used to determine citizenship as well as in civil and criminal justice, education, em-
ployment, health care, housing, and more. Id. 
2020] Legal Terminology and a Social Model of Disability 1197 
Barriers Act of 1968 was the first legislative push to remove the societal barri-
ers to inclusion and required that buildings be made universally accessible, 
although its language used “physically handicapped persons.”93 The term “de-
velopmental disability” was used for the first time in 1970 in the Developmen-
tal Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Amendments.94 This new 
term specifically included expanded protection to conditions that had not previ-
ously been named in legislation, such as cerebral palsy, autism, and epilepsy.95 
After a failed push to include disability as a protected class in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Congress enacted Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 (Section 504) and directly outlawed discrimination on the basis of disa-
bility, including “mental retardation,” for the first time.96 The Rehabilitation 
Act’s use of the more inclusive term, “equal opportunity,” as opposed to the po-
tentially discriminatory term, “equal treatment,” was key to advancing the push 
for accommodations that ensured equal access to employment and services.97 
The enactment of Section 504 utilized the language “handicapped,” but its 
definition reflected a shift from a medical model to a social one: a “handicapped 
individual” under Section 504 is “any person who (i) has a physical or mental 
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life 
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718, 719 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151–4157); Drimmer, supra note 5, at 1377. While the Architectural Barriers Act did 
not directly address societal discrimination, its enactment was a statutory recognition that in construct-
ing buildings, society had completely ignored people with disabilities. Drimmer, supra note 5, at 
1378. 
 94 Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-517, § 130, 84 Stat. 1316, 1316 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2661–2696); Reed, supra note 8, at 403. The purpose of the law was to provide services to people 
with developmental disabilities, including technical assistance, accessible facilities, and training. De-
velopmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Amendments of 1970 at 1316–17. 
 95 Reed, supra note 8, at 403. 
 96 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018); Perju, supra note 7, at 293. Section 504 directly outlawed discrimina-
tion against people with disabilities when it comes to accessibility as well as outright societal discrim-
ination. Reed, supra note 8, at 404. Section 504 has been referred to as “anticipatory politics” and 
“legislative afterthought” in that it was enacted not due to a substantial outside push by disability 
advocates, but rather due to individuals in the government who saw people with disabilities as a mi-
nority group that demanded recognition, like those of the civil rights and women’s movements. Perju, 
supra note 7, at 293; Rovner, supra note 37, at 1050. Disability rights scholars have been unable to 
pinpoint exactly where the impetus came from to enact civil rights legislation specifically to protect 
people with disabilities. Rovner, supra note 37, at 1050. Section 504 has therefore been characterized 
as “a law that preceded the movement” because it was passed without much input of or participation 
by the disability rights movement itself and with little debate in Congress. SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, 
DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN FEDERAL COURT 13 
(2005). 
 97 Reed, supra note 8, at 404. Equal treatment, for example, would be giving someone in a wheel-
chair and someone not in a wheelchair access to stairs, while equal opportunity means creating ac-
commodations that give the person in the wheelchair the same access to all floors in the building as 
someone who can use the stairs. Id. 
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such an impairment.”98 The inclusion of the “regarded as” and “record” prongs 
of the definition reflect the social model by recognizing that social perceptions 
and structures are as disabling as a diagnosed biological condition.99 
In 1987, the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline 
utilized a broad statutory definition of disability to hold that a woman with 
tuberculosis was a “handicapped individual” under Section 504.100 In doing so, 
the Court described how Congress included Section 504 in the 1975 amend-
ments to the Rehabilitation Act to address broader issues of societal discrimi-
nation.101 The definition of “handicap,” the Court went on, reflected this con-
cern with discrimination by protecting individuals with a record of or regarded 
as having an impairment, even if they do not outwardly present as such.102 This 
expansion of the definition of “disability” combats the negative effects of 
prevalent societal misconceptions about the “handicapped.”103 The Court there-
fore concluded that to allow discrimination based on an assumption that a person 
with tuberculosis is contagious would be inconsistent with the policy of Section 
504 to protect people from exactly this type of prejudice and ignorance.104 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111, 88 Stat. 1617, 1619 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); Perju, supra note 7, at 293–94. 
 99 Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 433; Perju, supra note 7, at 294. Section 504 also introduced a host 
of new concepts for both society and the law to interpret, including what legally constitutes “discrimi-
nation,” what is a sufficient “reasonable accommodation” for a person with disabilities, and when the 
provision of such accommodation can be excused because it is an “undue burden.” PELKA, supra note 
8, at 28. 
 100 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987). Plaintiff Gene Arline was fired 
from her job as an elementary school teacher after experiencing three relapses of tuberculosis over 
two years. Id. at 276. The Court ultimately held that although a person with tuberculosis is a “handi-
capped person” under Section 504, whether she was “otherwise qualified” for her position as a teacher 
would turn on whether she was at risk of infecting others. Id. at 287–89. The case was remanded for 
further findings of fact. Id. The District Court for the Middle District of Florida subsequently exam-
ined medical evidence regarding the communicability of Arline’s tuberculosis and found that there 
was no threat of her passing the disease on to her students. Arline v. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., 692 F. 
Supp. 1286, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 1988). She therefore was “otherwise qualified” for her job as a teacher 
and qualified for protection under Section 504 as an individual with a disability. Id. The court con-
cluded that Arline was fired because of unwarranted fears about her disease and that she was eligible 
for full back pay for the four years she was out of work. Id. 
 101 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., 480 U.S. at 277–79. 
 102 Id. at 279. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 284. The Court pushed back against condoning discrimination based on generalization, 
stating that the fact that some persons who have contagious diseases may pose a health threat to others 
does not justify excluding from the coverage of the statute all persons with actual or perceived conta-
gious diseases. Id. at 285. The Supreme Court had previously been less willing to provide constitu-
tional protections to people with intellectual disabilities, however. SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISA-
BILITIES ACT 74 (2001). In 1985, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Supreme Court 
held that a zoning ordinance prohibiting the creation of a “group home for the mentally retarded” 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 473 U.S. 432, 435, 448 (1985). In doing so, however, the Court 
held that people with disabilities were not a group entitled to a heightened level of scrutiny when it 
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The term “handicap,” featured prominently in Section 504, followed a simi-
lar trajectory as the term “retarded” and began to fall out of favor with the disa-
bility community in the mid-1980s because of its association with negative ste-
reotypes.105 The word was replaced with “disability,” and while the two words 
have been and continue to be used interchangeably, they have distinct defini-
tions.106 A “disability” is a condition of an individual, while a “handicap” is a 
restriction or disadvantage, often the result of society, that hinders one’s ability 
to function.107 “Handicapped” was no longer an acceptable label for people 
with disabilities, but it was still used sparingly in professional literature to de-
scribe barriers to access.108 
The shortcomings of Section 504 went beyond language, as it proved to 
be insufficient to address the pervasive societal discrimination against people 
with disabilities.109 Disability rights groups began to exert outside pressure on 
Congress for more comprehensive legislation because Section 504 applied on-
ly to federally-funded entities.110 As a result, Congress passed the ADA in 
1990, the most comprehensive civil rights legislation for people with disabili-
ties.111 The ADA became a “watershed” piece of legislation that reflected the 
legislative adoption of the social model of disability.112 The law included in its 
findings and purpose the history of unequal treatment of and discrimination 
against people with disabilities.113 The ADA took into consideration the expe-
                                                                                                                           
comes to discriminatory actions. Id. at 442; STEFAN, supra, at 74. The Court reasoned that people 
with disabilities are unable to function in society and therefore different and unequal treatment under 
the law is justified. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442–43; STEFAN, supra, at 74. At the same time, the 
Court denied that society is still prejudiced against people with disabilities, citing the increase in legis-
lative action to protect them from discrimination. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443; STEFAN, supra, at 
74. In doing so, the Court substantially weakened the very laws it cited as designated to protect indi-
viduals with disabilities from discrimination. STEFAN, supra, at 74. 
 105 See Simpson, supra note 1, at 12 (describing the roots of the word “handicap” as connoting 
literal caps in hand, as people with disabilities were commonly forced to beg on the street in order to 
survive); Devlieger, supra note 1, at 347 (describing the shift from “handicap” to “disability” that 
occurred in the 1980s); Ford et al., supra note 12, at 108 (describing how the negative connotations 
acquired by the term “retard” led to a push against its usage in favor of more inclusive language).  
 106 Jerome E. Bickenbach et al., Models of Disablement, Universalism, and the International 
Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps, 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1173, 1175 (1999); 
Devlieger, supra note 1, at 347–48. 
 107 Bickenbach et al., supra note 106, at 1175. 
 108 Devlieger, supra note 1, at 347. Despite the fact that it is infrequently used in professional 
literature, the term “handicapped” continues to remain prominent in public life, such as on parking 
signs. Id. at 348. 
 109 Perju, supra note 7, at 294–95. 
 110 Id. at 294–96. 
 111 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213; Perju, supra note 7, at 296; Reed, supra note 8, at 404. 
 112 Rovner, supra note 37, at 1044. 
 113 42 U.S.C. § 12101. The legislative findings of the ADA addressed exclusion resulting from 
discrimination in many forms, including outright animus-based prejudice, generalizing stereotypes, 
and physical barriers inherent in the country’s infrastructure. Id. § 12101(a)(5); Bagenstos, supra note 
7, at 423, 425. 
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riences of people with disabilities and addressed five major areas of law: em-
ployment discrimination, discrimination by public and government entities, 
public accommodations, telecommunications accommodations, and miscella-
neous provisions.114 For the first time, individuals seeking redress for disabil-
ity-based discrimination in both public and private institutions had a cause of 
action in federal courts.115 
The ADA utilized the term “individuals with disabilities” rather than “hand-
icap” to modernize the legal language with currently accepted terminology.116 
Congress recognized that language can convey stereotypes and other conde-
scending connotations and therefore ensured that the language in the ADA re-
stored dignity to Americans with disabilities.117 Congress also deliberately in-
cluded “Americans” in the title of the law to reflect that people with disabili-
ties are part of the fabric of American society and have equal rights to access 
as all other individuals in the country.118 Despite this positive change in termi-
nology, the ADA retained word-for-word the definition of disability from Sec-
tion 504.119 
The ADA was unlike other major civil rights laws in that it was passed 
well before public perception had shifted rather than as a response to outside 
pressure.120 As the ADA increased access to society for people with disabili-
ties, disability advocates were still pushing for more inclusive and less stigma-
                                                                                                                           
 114 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213; STEFAN, supra note 104, at 88–89. Congress accepted submissions 
of hundreds of written accounts to learn about the experiences of people with disabilities. STEFAN, supra 
note 104, at 88. These so-called diaries described the discrimination people with disabilities face every 
day. Id. The diaries served the dual purpose of providing evidence to Congress as well as mobilizing 
individuals with disabilities to confront disability discrimination, recognize its causes, and become a part 
of the grassroots fight to end it. YOUNG, supra note 39, at 62. Justin Dart, vice-chairperson of the Nation-
al Council on Disability, who used a wheelchair after experiencing polio as a child, traveled around the 
country collecting the stories of the disability community. Id. at 41. Dart presented a box of the diaries to 
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources as part of Senate hearings on the ADA in 1989. Id. at 86, 
88. 
 115 Perju, supra note 7, at 295. 
 116 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 323–24. The Education of Handicapped Children Act was similarly 
renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) as part of a series of 1990 amend-
ments to reflect this push for more inclusive education and language. Education of the Handicapped 
Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat. 1103, 1142 (codified as amended at 
20 U.S.C §§ 1400–1445 (2018)); U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS, HISTORY: TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA 3 (2007). 
Senator Paul Simon, in comments on the Senate floor, approved the removal of the term “handicap” in 
favor of person-first terminology. 136 CONG. REC. 26,929, 27,033 (1990). The new language reflected 
the guiding force behind the IDEA: that educational services should be individualized and designed to 
meet the needs of each unique student. Id.  
 117 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 323–24. 
 118 Id. 
 119 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974 at 1619; Perju, supra note 7, at 
296. Despite proposals calling for more a detailed definition, Congress decided to leave the definition 
of disability unchanged because the courts were already familiar with it. Id. at 297. 
 120 Rovner, supra note 37, at 1060. 
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tizing language to talk about disability throughout society and the law.121 Much 
of the motivation for the change in language came from grassroots organiza-
tion and advocacy by people with disabilities and their families, who argued 
that the continued use of terms like “mental retardation” became offensive to 
many people with disabilities.122 Agencies and programs began to change their 
names to remove the stigmatizing “r-word” from their names.123 
In 2010, President Obama signed Rosa’s Law, the first major legislation 
to directly address the stigma associated with labels given to people with disa-
bilities.124 The law was the result of a campaign by Rosa Marcellino, a young 
girl with Down Syndrome, and her family to end the use of the “r-word” in 
state and federal law.125 In the words of Rosa’s mother: 
So, when my daughter’s IEP [individualized education program] 
coding was changed to “Mentally Retarded,” I wondered how a so-
ciety that had become so empathetic regarding the language it used 
to describe so many of its members, had not recognized the offen-
sive language still used to describe one of its most vulnerable popu-
lations.126 
The purpose of Rosa’s Law was to ensure that statutory language mirrors the 
policy underlying laws like the ADA that people with disabilities should be 
given equal opportunity and access to society.127 The law mandated that the 
term “mental retardation” be replaced with “intellectual disability” in numer-
                                                                                                                           
 121 Ford et al., supra note 12, at 108. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Tassé & Grover, supra note 73, at 123–24; Ford et al., supra note 12, at 108–09. The Ameri-
can Association on Mental Retardation (formerly the American Association on Mental Deficiency) 
changed its name in 2007 to the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. 
Tassé & Grover, supra note 73, at 124. 
 124 Rosa’s Law at 2643; Ford et al., supra note 12, at 109. 
 125 Ford et al., supra note 12, at 109; Luke Cyphers, Meet the Little Girl Who Wiped Out Govern-
ment Use of the R-Word, ESPNW (July 22, 2015), https://www.espn.com/espnw/news-commentary/
story/_/id/13287823/meet-little-girl-wiped-government-use-r-word [https://perma.cc/ERZ3-6NBP]. 
Rosa and her family began a campaign in their home state of Maryland to remove the word “mentally 
retarded” from state laws because it became abhorrent to Rosa and those who knew and loved her. 
Ford et al., supra note 12, at 109. After Rosa’s Law was passed in Maryland in 2009, the campaign 
gained national momentum. Id. It was championed in Congress by Senator Barbara Mikulski, en-
dorsed by forty-four national disability organizations, and passed by unanimous vote. Id. 
 126 Ford et al., supra note 12, at 109. 
 127 S. REP. NO. 111-244, at 3. 
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ous federal health, education, and labor laws.128 Following its implementation, 
many states banned the use of the term in their laws and regulations.129 
D. “That Doesn’t Mean There Aren’t Huge Challenges Ahead, and Much 
Yet to Be Done”: Defining Disability Under the ADA130 
There are two major competing schools of thought that have drastically 
different views of the use of language in laws and in judicial decision mak-
ing.131 Formalism is the view that legal decisions must strictly follow prece-
dent, while realism asserts that the legal decision making should consider and 
be informed by economic, social, and ethical implications.132 Formalist deci-
sions often focus on legal terminology, with the inquiry turning on whether the 
facts or parties fit a predetermined definition.133 Legal realism critiques this di-
vorcing of legal terminology and social reality and instead promotes language as 
a conceptual jumping-off point rather than a self-contained legal solution.134 
These schools of thought become relevant because to bring a case under 
the ADA, plaintiffs first must prove that they meet the definition of disability 
under the law, and then that they experienced discrimination because of their 
disability.135 The Supreme Court did not comment on the ADA until its 1997 
                                                                                                                           
 128 Ford et al., supra note 12, at 109. This included critical laws like the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act, which mandates a free and appropriate public education to students with disabili-
ties. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Ford et al., supra note 12, at 109. Rosa’s Law did not apply to the 
Social Security Act due to congressional jurisdictional issues. Ford et al., supra note 12, at 109. 
 129 Ford et al., supra note 12, at 109; Back et al., supra note 4, at 4. A similar grassroots campaign 
known as “Spread the Word to End the Word” was established in 2009 to end the use of the word 
“retarded” as a colloquial slur. About Spread the Word, SPREAD THE WORD, https://www.spreadthe
word.global/about [https://perma.cc/HJH5-4CY5]. The campaign was created by youth with and 
without intellectual disabilities and includes an annual day of awareness, a pledge to stop using the so-
called “r-word,” and resources for schools and students across the country to join the movement. Take 
Action, SPREAD THE WORD, https://www.spreadtheword.global/take-action/ [https://perma.cc/NH9M-
8BEZ]. As education has moved away from secluding students with disabilities in separate classrooms 
and toward inclusion with their peers, the importance of the terminology used by educators and stu-
dents has increased. Back et al., supra note 4, at 4. Students with disabilities often already struggle 
with self-esteem and peer acceptance, and the language used both in the classroom and the hallways 
can further impact the way they are perceived and the way they perceive themselves. Id. 
 130 Aftermath, in WHAT WE HAVE DONE, supra note 8, at 548, 554. Mary Lou Breslin, who con-
tracted polio when she was eleven, describes the accomplishment of passing the ADA as “em-
bedd[ing] in the national psyche” the idea that individuals with disabilities deserve access to and in-
clusion in society. Id. at 65, 554. That said, she notes “we may lose ground on some court cases,” but 
she is hopeful “there isn’t going to be a return to the ways of forty or fifty years ago.” Id. at 555. 
 131 HUTTON, supra note 18, at 11–13. 
 132 Id. at 10–11. 
 133 Id. at 12. Textualism in constitutional jurisprudence is a product of the formalist school of 
legal theory and promotes application of the law that strictly adheres to the language of the Constitu-
tion at the time of its creation. Id. at 13; Stephen M. Durden, Plain Language Textualism: Some Per-
sonal Predilections Are More Equal Than Others, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 337, 341 (2008).  
 134 HUTTON, supra note 18, at 11–12. 
 135 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477–78. 
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and 1998 terms when it decided a series of eight ADA cases.136 Four of these 
turned on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the definition of disability.137 
The holdings in these cases utilized a formalist method of judicial inquiry that 
substantially limited the scope of individuals protected by the ADA.138 The 
Supreme Court honed in on the “substantially limits” prong of the definition of 
disability under the ADA.139 For example, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
the Court held that two twin sisters with severe vision impairments did not 
qualify as “disabled” because their use of corrective measures like contact 
lenses and glasses meant they did not experience any substantial limitation.140 
The Court noted the use of the present indicative verb “limits” and concluded 
that the test needs to be whether the facts of the case show that a person is 
presently limited in some way.141 The Court similarly rejected arguments that 
the plaintiffs met the “regarded as” prong of the definition because although 
their employer decided poor vision precluded them from holding the position 
they applied for, this did not qualify as being perceived as having a “substan-
tially limiting impairment” in their ability to work.142 By deciding the case 
based on the definition of disability, the Court never reached the question of 
whether the plaintiffs experienced disability-based discrimination.143 
                                                                                                                           
 136 Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 398. 
 137 Id. In the years after the passage of the ADA, qualifying as an individual with a disability was 
incredibly burdensome for plaintiffs, and between 1995 and 1996, only one plaintiff in six met the 
statutory definition of disability. Perju, supra note 7, at 314.  
 138 Perju, supra note 7, at 315; see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482 (holding that courts should take correc-
tive measures into account when determining whether an individual meets the statutory definition of 
disability); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (applying Sutton to find 
that plaintiff did not qualify as an individual with a disability because medication mitigated the effects 
of his high blood pressure); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 559, 565–66 (1999) (hold-
ing that a truck driver who was blind in one eye was not an individual with a disability because his 
brain’s own mitigating measures meant he was not substantially limited by his monocular vision). 
 139 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (defining a disability as an impairment that substantially limits 
an individual in a major life activity); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482 (holding that individuals are not disa-
bled if mitigating measures mean that they are not substantially limited in any major life activity). 
 140 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481. The plaintiffs in Sutton applied to be airline pilots but were rejected 
because they failed to meet the employer’s vision requirement, which was an uncorrected vision level 
of at least 20/100. Id. at 475–76. The plaintiffs’ uncorrected vision in each eye was 20/200 and 20/400 
or worse, but each had 20/20 vision when wearing corrective lenses and met all other requirements for 
the pilot position. Id. 
 141 Id. at 482 (emphasis added); Perju, supra note 7, at 313. 
 142 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492–93. 
 143 Perju, supra note 7, at 314. The Court further limited the class of people who qualified as 
having a disability in a 2002 case, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams. 534 U.S. 
184, 196–97 (2002). The plaintiff was fired from her job because she was unable to perform automo-
bile assembly line tasks due to carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis. Id. at 187, 190. The Court nar-
rowed the definition of “substantially limited” to having an impairment that prevents or seriously 
limits someone from doing activities that are crucial to daily life, and held that not being able to per-
form the tasks of automobile assembly did not meet this requirement. Id. at 197–98, 201. The Court 
specifically stated its intent in this case was to maintain a high standard to meet the definition of disa-
bility under the ADA. Id. at 197. 
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The Supreme Court applied Sutton to a subsequent case, Albertson’s, Inc. 
v. Kirkingburg, in 1999.144 The plaintiff, Hallie Kirkingburg, was hired as a 
truckdriver but was fired soon after when he could not meet the Department of 
Transportation’s vision standards because he was blind in his left eye.145 The 
Court, despite stating that it could resolve the case without determining wheth-
er the plaintiff was an individual with a disability, went on to resolve that very 
issue.146 The Court described how Kirkingburg’s brain was able to compensate 
for his blindness such that he could adequately see out of one eye.147 It went on 
to conclude that because Kirkingburg’s brain was able to mitigate for his 
blindness the same way medications or corrective devices might for a different 
condition, he was not substantially limited in any way and therefore did not 
qualify for protection under the ADA.148 
Congress amended the ADA in 2008 in response to the narrowed defini-
tion of the Supreme Court.149 The ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) explicitly 
rejected the Supreme Court’s holding in Sutton and subsequent cases as inap-
propriately limiting the class of people afforded protection under the ADA.150 
Although the ADAAA did not alter the statutory definition of disability in any 
way, Congress instructed courts to apply a broad interpretation of the definition 
                                                                                                                           
 144 Albertson’s, Inc., 527 U.S. at 565–66. 
 145 Id. at 559–60. The plaintiff had over ten years of experience as a driver and passed the road 
test required for the job. Id. at 558. He was hired by and drove for the defendant company, a grocery 
store, for a year because his doctor mistakenly certified that he met the vision requirements. Id. at 
558–59. After taking a leave of absence for an injury, he was examined by another doctor who real-
ized that he did not meet the standards and would need a waiver to continue driving for the defendant. 
Id. at 559–60. 
 146 Id. at 562. 
 147 Id. at 564. 
 148 Id. at 565–66. Similarly, in 2000, in Bartlett v. New York State Board of Bar Examiners, the 
Second Circuit held that the fact that a law student had figured out ways to compensate for—and be 
successful in law school despite—her reading disability did not remove her from protection as an 
individual with a disability under the ADA. 156 F.3d 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1998). Marilyn Bartlett sued 
for disability discrimination after the New York State Board of Law Examiners refused to provide her 
with any accommodations for the bar examination. Id. at 324–25. The court held that any self-
accommodations that Bartlett employed to mitigate for her disability should not be considered when 
determining whether she is “disabled” under the ADA. Id. at 329. The court subsequently ordered the 
Board to provide her with reasonable accommodations for the bar examination. Id. The Board ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, who remanded Bartlett for reconsideration in light of their decision in 
Albertson’s, Inc. that self-accommodations should be considered when determining whether an indi-
vidual has a disability. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs v. Bartlett, 527 U.S. 1031, 1031 (1999). The 
case was ultimately remanded to the District Court, which held that even with her self-
accommodations Bartlett was substantially limited in her ability to read and therefore still qualified for 
protection under the ADA. Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, No. 93 CIV. 4986(SS), 2001 
WL 930792, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  
 149 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A); Perju, supra note 7, at 316. 
 150 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12102). The ADAAA explicitly rejected Sutton’s consideration of 
mitigating measures and narrowing of the “regarded as” prong of the definition as well as the strict 
standards for “substantially limits” established by Toyota Motor Manufacturing. Id. 
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of disability.151 The ADAAA reinforced that the purpose of the ADA was to 
tackle the widespread discrimination against people with disabilities and asserted 
that the primary focus of ADA inquiries should be on whether employers have 
met their obligation to reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities.152 
II. “THERE WAS LIKE A UNISON OF PEOPLE WHO SAID, ‘WE HATE THAT 
NAME! WE HATE THAT!’”: THE IMPLICATIONS OF NAMING  
AND DEFINING DISABILITY153 
Tracing the history of disability highlights that both language and the law 
have the ability to create norms in society.154 When it comes to disability, legal 
and social terminology and definitions have important implications for how 
individuals with disabilities are perceived and treated.155 Section A of this Part 
describes the ways language can both shape and be shaped by societal percep-
tions and the implications this can have from a social science perspective.156 
Section B describes the impact language can have on how people with disabili-
                                                                                                                           
 151 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). The ADAAA allowed for the consideration of eyeglasses or contact 
lenses but instructed that courts not consider other mitigating measures such as medication or assistive 
technology. Id. § 12102(4)(E)(i)–(ii). 
 152 See id. § 12102(4)(A) (mandating that the definition of disability should be interpreted broadly 
to afford broad coverage to individuals with disabilities); Elizabeth F. Emens, Disabling Attitudes: 
U.S. Disability Law and the ADA Amendments Act, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 206 (2012) (describing 
how the passage of the ADAAA was an attempt to restore the original goals of the ADA); Perju, su-
pra note 7, at 297 (asserting how important the ADAAA was in maintaining a broad interpretation of 
disability). Many lower courts have subsequently followed the mandate to interpret the definition of 
disability more broadly. Jana K. Terry, The ADA Amendments Act Three Years After Passage: The 
EEOC’s Regulations and the First Court Decisions Emerge at Last, 58 FED. LAW. 49, 51 (2011); see 
Fleck v. Wilmac Corp., No. 10-05562, 2011 WL 1899198, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (applying the less 
restrictive standards of the ADAAA and finding that plaintiff with a chronic ankle injury that prevent-
ed her from standing or walking for long periods of time was an individual with a disability); Gil v. 
Vortex, LLC, 697 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236, 240 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that plaintiff, despite not pre-
cisely pleading how limited he was by monocular vision, met the relaxed definition of disability under 
the ADAAA). Other courts, however, have continued to cite precedent from before the ADAAA and 
have held that plaintiffs did not meet the definition of disability. See Rumbin v. Ass’n of Am. Med. 
Colls., 803 F. Supp. 2d 83, 93 (D. Conn. 2011) (citing pre-ADAAA cases, including Sutton, to support 
finding that plaintiff with convergence insufficiency, a condition limiting the ability to focus on near-
by objects, was not substantially limited in seeing, reading, or writing and therefore was not an indi-
vidual with a disability). 
 153 Self-Advocates, in WHAT WE HAVE DONE, supra note 8, at 324, 328. Dennis Heath, a social 
worker, got this response when he asked a group of residents at the Fairview Training Center in Ore-
gon what they thought of the name “retarded.” Id. 
 154 See Rovner, supra note 37, at 1056 (discussing how the able-bodied majority of society creat-
ed and therefore benefited from the law and policy throughout history at the expense of individuals 
with disabilities); Galvin, supra note 13 (discussing how labeling disability contributes to the sense of 
disability as the “other” and how disability terminology has become attached to stereotypical images). 
 155 See Kanter, supra note 13, at 433 (discussing the relationship between disability language, 
law, and power structures); Perju, supra note 7, at 297 (describing how changing the definition of 
disability could have major implications for perception of people with disabilities). 
 156 See infra notes 160–170 and accompanying text. 
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ties are perceived and treated in society.157 Section C discusses how the law 
has the power to institutionalize norms, and how disability is one area where 
the law can either legitimize or reject discriminatory terminology.158 Section D 
discusses the push and pull between the most recent developments in the lan-
guage of disability, known as person-first language and identity-first language, 
and the beliefs underlying the two concepts.159 
A. The Power of Language 
Social scientists assert that language has powerful implications for shap-
ing perception and social attitudes.160 The terminology we use imputes mean-
ing and attaches connotations and associations to people that may or may not 
align with the way society perceives and treats that group.161 Dominant groups 
in society have often exerted power over other groups to maintain the status 
quo by imposing a name or label that defines what is “normal” and what is 
not.162 For example, the push during the Civil Rights Movement for the term 
“Black” to replace derogatory terms was a deliberate attempt to move away 
from language imposed by the dominant white society that implied inferiori-
ty.163 The pervasive use of language and labels by these dominant groups solid-
ifies stereotypical beliefs in the fabric of society that confine people to socially 
mandated roles.164 
This type of linguistic categorization can also lead to generalization, be-
cause individuality is devalued when a wide variety of experiences are charac-
terized by a single term or phrase.165 Because a label tends to direct attention to 
a particular characteristic, it distracts from any other elements of the object or 
individual.166 Furthermore, language and labels impact not only the way others 
                                                                                                                           
 157 See infra notes 171–186 and accompanying text. 
 158 See infra notes 187–209 and accompanying text. 
 159 See infra notes 210–221 and accompanying text. 
 160 Devlieger, supra note 1, at 346. 
 161 Id. at 347; Zola, supra note 14, at 167. The generally accepted view is that language shapes an 
individual’s thoughts and perceptions, but some social scientists push back on the idea that language 
shapes reality. Atkins-Sayre, supra note 14, at 9–10. 
 162 Atkins-Sayre, supra note 14, at 9–10; Galvin, supra note 13. 
 163 Angelica Mucchi-Faina, Visible or Influential? Language Reforms and Gender (In)equality, 
44 SOC. SCI. INFO. 189, 191 (2005). 
 164 Atkins-Sayre, supra note 14, at 8; Zola, supra note 14, at 167; Galvin, supra note 13. For 
example, the gender equality movement included a push for non-sexist and non-gendered language. 
Back et al., supra note 4, at 16. Naming can also serve a positive function by creating importance and 
understanding where there was none. Atkins-Sayre, supra note 14, at 9. For example, the creation of 
the term “sexual harassment” gave a name to a terrible but common occurrence that previously had 
gone unaddressed. Id. 
 165 Zola, supra note 14, at 169. The practice of using one single characteristic to describe an entire 
concept or individual is called metonymy. Back et al., supra note 4, at 16. 
 166 Atkins-Sayre, supra note 14, at 9. The function of language to filter perception and direct 
attention is sometimes referred to as the “terministic screen.” Id. 
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view the people being described, but also how those people view them-
selves.167 A label can restrict an individual’s identity by reducing it to a single 
descriptive word.168 Being classified as a member of a certain group connects 
an individual’s identity or sense of self with society’s definition of that 
group.169 When such a label is attached to negative stereotypes or connota-
tions, it may have damaging effects on an individual’s sense of self-worth.170 
B. Language and Disability 
The power of language is particularly visceral in the disability context, as 
language has and continues to directly relate to the way society perceives, in-
teracts with, and excludes individuals with disabilities.171 The words a society 
uses to describe people with disabilities reveal that society’s values and per-
ceptions.172 Terms like “handicap” and “retard” are attached to specific social-
ly created images and concepts, and referring to individuals as such projects 
those images onto them.173 As outlined in Part I of this Note, the history of the 
treatment of people with disabilities has created associations between these 
words and images of helplessness, deformity, fear, inferiority, and weakness.174 
These associations then directly contributed to social and legal structures that not 
only marginalized people with disabilities, but also equated them with evil and 
sin to be eradicated from society.175 Utilizing such terms represents an ac-
ceptance of discrimination and oppression that can range from failing to provide 
proper accommodations to segregating individuals in institutions.176 Further-
more, language can influence the way people with disabilities perceive them-
selves; when an individual constantly hears language that tells them they are in-
ferior, sick, or unproductive, they may ultimately internalize that message.177 
                                                                                                                           
 167 Zola, supra note 14, at 169. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Galvin, supra note 13. 
 170 See Zola, supra note 14, at 169 (stating the labels used to describe people with disabilities can 
influence the way they view themselves and the way others view them even more than whether they 
use sign language or sit in a wheelchair); Back et al., supra note 4, at 4 (discussing how language used 
in the school environment can negatively impact both students’ self-esteem as well as the way they are 
perceived by others). 
 171 Back et al., supra note 4, at 2. 
 172 Kanter, supra note 13, at 433. 
 173 Galvin, supra note 13. 
 174 See id. (describing how the language of disability has attached to concepts of deformity and 
inferiority, resulting in feelings of negativity towards the people such language describes); supra notes 
24–152 and accompanying text. 
 175 Rovner, supra note 37, at 1054; Verdict of History: The Forgotten Years: 1870–1940, supra 
note 44, at 10; see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (justifying the upholding of mandatory 
sterilization laws by equating the “feeble-minded” with crime and other social ills). 
 176 See Zola, supra note 14, at 167–68 (describing how once an individual is labeled sick or crazy, 
their behavior is easily dismissed, and society can explain away anything they say or ask for). 
 177 Shakespeare, supra note 13, at 105. 
1208 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1183 
The negative effects of language are clearly evidenced by the constant 
evolution of terminology, as each new word used to describe disability eventu-
ally became so embedded with negative connotations that it was unusable.178 
Each subsequent adaptation—such as Rosa’s Law’s sweeping mandate that 
“mentally retarded” be replaced by “people with disabilities” in federal legisla-
tion—is an attempt to align the social and legal language with the context of 
the time.179 Changes in language reflect a recognition that people with disabili-
ties are just as deserving of respect and inclusion as anyone else and should be 
described as such.180 
The consequences of disability language go beyond the labels; even gram-
mar and parts of speech impact the perceptions of the people described.181 The 
medical model resulted in the use of language like “suffering from” or “afflicted 
with,” perpetuating an idea of disability as a medical infirmity and associating 
the person described with helplessness and dependence.182 Furthermore, the idea 
that someone is “suffering” is a societally imposed belief of what it means to 
have a disability rather than an accurate representation of an individual’s real 
experience.183 The use of adjectives as nouns, such as “the mentally retarded,” 
generalizes an entire group and focuses attention on only one facet of an indi-
vidual’s identity.184 Active and passive language invoke specific relationships 
between the subject and the verb; there is a noticeable difference of perception 
between “a person confined to a wheelchair” and “a person using a wheel-
chair.”185 The verb “is” versus “has” has similar effects: “is” equates something 
in meaning (“he is disabled”) whereas “has” connotes a relationship in which the 
person retains identity and control (“he has epilepsy”).186 
                                                                                                                           
 178 Ford et al., supra note 12, at 108. The linguist Steven Pinker coined the term “euphemism 
treadmill” to refer to this phenomenon: often, when a word is deemed offensive and replaced with a 
new term, the negative connotations eventually become imputed onto the new word until it, too, is 
considered offensive. Steven Pinker, The Game of the Name, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1994), https://nyti.
ms/2vczhKg [https://perma.cc/B5GX-4QT9]. 
 179 See Ford et al., supra note 12, at 108, 109 (describing the shift from the term “retard” and its 
negative connotations to more inclusive language). 
 180 Kanter, supra note 13, at 434. 
 181 Galvin, supra note 13. 
 182 Zola, supra note 14, at 168; Galvin, supra note 13. An added consequence of the medical 
model is the equating of disability with illness: once a person’s entire life is defined by an illness it 
allows society to discount the validity of anything they have said or done. Zola, supra note 14, at 168. 
 183 Zola, supra note 14, at 170. 
 184 Id. at 169; Galvin, supra note 13. Because the presence of a disability is often the most visible 
characteristic of a person, using that description as a collective noun to refer to them obliterates the 
rest of their identity. Galvin, supra note 13. 
 185 Zola, supra note 14, at 170. 
 186 Id. 
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C. The Law, Language, and Power 
Legal labels and terminology similarly have the power to shape identities 
and perceptions.187 Because the law exists to maintain social order, it has the 
formidable ability to institutionalize and formalize societally accepted 
norms.188 Law is often referred to as a form of social engineering that defines 
the roles for individuals in society, how one must conform to that role, and the 
consequences for failing to do so.189 In effect, the law has the ability to both 
create and maintain the status quo.190 Often, this relates to determining what is 
“normal” in society and how to respond to any differences.191 The legislature 
decides what norms are to be implemented and incorporated into society 
through its law-making function, with such laws typically reflective of the in-
terests of the groups already in power in society.192 When courts then resolve 
discrepancies or ambiguities in the laws, they ultimately create new norms.193 
These processes can create and maintain systems of privilege and exclusion.194 
Throughout history, the able-bodied majority created public policy and there-
fore conferred benefits on themselves while imposing disadvantages on people 
with disabilities.195 
The law is an institution created by and perpetuated through the spoken 
and written word: it is used to present arguments, negotiate, deliver opinions, 
and pass laws.196 When the legislature or courts utilize language in the law that 
has a stigmatizing or discriminatory effect, that stigma becomes a sanctioned 
part of the normative system.197 For example, as described in Part I, legislation 
mandating the sterilization of the “feeble-minded” and subsequent endorse-
ment by the Supreme Court of the practice legitimized the norm that people 
                                                                                                                           
 187 Kaaryn Gustafson, Symposium, Disability, Fluidity, and Measuring Without Baselines, 75 
MISS. L.J. 1007, 1025–26 (2006); Kanter, supra note 13, at 439. 
 188 CHAMBLISS & SEIDMAN, supra note 13, at 8. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Kanter, supra note 13, at 439–41. 
 191 Id. at 446. 
 192 CHAMBLISS & SEIDMAN, supra note 13, at 65. 
 193 Id. at 35. Chambliss and Seidman describe how courts originated as dispute-resolution to pun-
ish those who broke societal norms, but have since become norm-enforcing institutions in cases where 
the law is unclear. Id. 
 194 Gustafson, supra note 187, at 1026–27. 
 195 Rovner, supra note 37, at 1056. Robert Henley Woody describes how social systems in the 
United States were built to accommodate the needs of the majority and therefore have trouble accom-
modating people with complex physical or mental needs. WOODY, supra note 42, at 3. The legal sys-
tem has trouble determining how to address the needs of people with disabilities, specifically when it 
comes to assessing the legal ramifications of having a disability as well as how to uphold the rights of 
people with disabilities. Id. at 4. 
 196 Kanter, supra note 13, at 432. 
 197 See CHAMBLISS & SEIDMAN, supra note 13, at 10 (describing how the law is a tool that de-
fines both role and role performance in society); supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text. 
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with disabilities were inferior and posed a threat to society.198 The law can also 
directly result in stigmatizing language appearing throughout society, such as 
“handicapped parking” signs resulting from the ADA or inclusion of “mentally 
retarded” as a disability category on a student’s education plan in school.199 It 
can also mandate its disappearance: Rosa’s Law, for example, is a direct legis-
lative rejection of certain language and the offensive connotations attached to 
it, thus supporting a new norm of ensuring people with disabilities have the 
same access and opportunities as those without.200 Laws such as the ADA that 
give people a new set of rights and utilize inclusive language can change per-
ceptions by imposing a legal duty on society at large to develop a better under-
standing of people with disabilities and actively work to facilitate their inclu-
sion.201 These laws also impact individuals’ sense of self-worth and agency by 
giving them a legal avenue to challenge discrimination.202 
It is not only the terminology utilized in the law that is significant, but al-
so how that terminology is defined.203 Disability is at once a social construct 
and a legal construct, with definitions of each that may or may not be congru-
ent.204 While laws create different groups, judges get to decide who falls into 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (upholding Virginia’s mandatory sterilization law for individuals 
deemed “feeble-minded”); Verdict of History: The Forgotten Years: 1870–1940, supra note 44, at 12 
(stating that the case was likely brought with lawyers on both sides hoping that the sterilization laws 
would be upheld by the Court). 
 199 See Devlieger, supra note 1, at 347 (highlighting the introduction of signs indicating accessi-
bility for people with disabilities and other accommodations as a direct result of the passage of the 
ADA); Ford et al., supra note 12, at 109 (describing how jarring it was for a mother to see her daugh-
ter labeled “mentally retarded” by her Individualized Education Plan when that language was no long-
er socially acceptable). 
 200 Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643, 2643 (2010) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of the U.S.C.); see S. REP. NO. 111-244, at 2–3 (2010) (stating that the law should mir-
ror the societal departure from the term “mentally retarded” in favor of language that better reflects 
the current perception of people with disabilities as equal members of society). 
 201 Emens, supra note 152, at 220–21. 
 202 See Gustafson, supra note 187, at 1017–18 (stating that the ADA reminds people with disabili-
ties that accommodation and nondiscrimination should be the new normal, and gives them an avenue 
to challenge instances where that is not the case). 
 203 See Atkins-Sayre, supra note 14, at 9 (describing how defining what constituted sexual har-
assment generated notice and understanding of a pervasive yet previously unaddressed phenomenon); 
Perju, supra note 7, at 306 (describing the judicial power of defining a term like disability to change 
the social, political, and legal environment to the push for equal access). 
 204 Gustafson, supra note 187, at 1032. When “mentally retarded” was the preferred term for 
people with intellectual disabilities, legal definitions often grouped together people with mental retar-
dation and people with mental illness under the definition of “mentally defective persons,” leading to 
unreliable and inconsistent legal treatment of people with a wide variety of conditions. WOODY, supra 
note 42, at 17–18. Creating a legal definition for disability can be incredibly difficult because of the 
wide array of conditions and experiences it encompasses. Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 405–06. Defin-
ing the term remains crucially important, however, to establishing a claim of disability discrimination. 
Id. 
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those legal categories.205 Whether individuals can meet the legal definition of 
disability has drastic implications for the kinds of services and protections they 
are entitled to under the law, regardless of the social perceptions at the time.206 
Legal categorizations have led to tension throughout history, as individuals 
with disabilities pushed back against legal language that was stigmatizing, but 
that otherwise granted them access to countless services and protections.207 
Whether judges subscribe to a more formalist or realist view of legal terminol-
ogy can have drastic implications for the individuals that disability laws are 
meant to protect.208 The Supreme Court’s formalist approach to defining disa-
bility has had the effect of substantially narrowing the class of people protected 
by the ADA, contrary to Congress’s objectives in enacting the law.209 
D. Person-First and Identity-First Language 
The most recent push for more inclusive language regarding disability, re-
flected in the ADA, is commonly referred to as “person-” or “people-first lan-
guage.”210 This language reflects the social model of disability by emphasizing 
the person rather than defining individuals by their disabilities.211 Advocates 
for person-first language posit that individuals are much more than just their 
                                                                                                                           
 205 Gustafson, supra note 187, at 1026–27. Robert Cover describes legal interpretation as “the 
imposition of violence upon others” because of the drastic effects judicial rulings can have—the loss 
of a child, property, freedom, or life. Kanter, supra note 13, at 433 (quoting Robert M. Cover, Vio-
lence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986)). 
 206 See WOODY, supra note 42, at 18 (describing how the failure to develop a consistent legal 
definition for “mentally retarded” led to unreliable and inconsistent treatment of such individuals 
under the law); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2018) (forbidding employers from discriminating 
against “a qualified individual with a disability,” therefore requiring a person to be categorized as such 
before guaranteeing her any protection). 
 207 See PELKA, supra note 8, at 12 (describing how being found by a doctor to have a disability 
was crucial to being eligible for workers’ compensation in the early twentieth century); Schalock et 
al., supra note 92, at 120 (describing how a diagnosis of mental retardation was crucial to being found 
eligible under federal law in areas such as immigration, education, social security, Medicaid, and 
employment). 
 208 See HUTTON, supra note 18, at 11–13 (highlighting that a legal formalist will look only at 
legal language itself while a legal realist will consider the sociological implications when applying 
such language to each case); Perju, supra note 7, at 313, 314–15 (outlining the implications of the 
judicial narrowing of the statutory definition of “individual with a disability” under the ADA). 
 209 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–54 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12102); Perju, supra note 7, at 315; see, e.g., Sutton v. United Air 
Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that mitigating measures—such as corrective lenses or a 
prosthetic limb—must be considered when deciding whether a person is an “individual with a disabil-
ity” under the ADA). The Supreme Court’s approach removed individuals with conditions such as 
breast cancer, multiple sclerosis, lymphoma, brain tumors, epilepsy, and depression from protection 
under the ADA. Perju, supra note 7, at 315. 
 210 Simpson, supra note 1, at 14; Back et al., supra note 4, at 4–5; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101 
(utilizing the term “individuals with disabilities,” an example of person-first language). 
 211 Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 258. 
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disability.212 This approach eliminates the use of stigmatizing and generalized 
labels like “disabled” or “the epileptic” as nouns that describe an individual or 
group and refers to them instead as “people with disabilities” or “people with 
epilepsy.”213 Those who prefer this language believe that putting people first 
will counter negative stereotypes and promote inclusion of and equal oppor-
tunity for individuals with disabilities.214 From a grammatical perspective, the 
use of the preposition “with” slows the response of the writer or speaker and can 
lead them to reflect on the language they are using and the impact it can have.215 
Although the majority of legislation now employs person-first language, some 
judicial decisions continue to use stigmatizing collective language.216 
Despite this preference for person-first language, there has been a recent 
push from some in the disability rights community to return to the use of 
“identity-first language” to give the individual or group a way to proudly re-
claim disability and alter its connotation from one of shame to one of pride.217 
Advocates for identity-first language argue that dissociating the person from 
the disability reinforces the idea that there is something undesirable about hav-
ing a disability.218 Asserting disability, on the other hand, promotes autonomy 
and indicates a decision to reclaim control over one’s disability identity.219 Im-
puting a previously negative word with positive and liberating meanings em-
powers individuals to resist the word’s negative use in society.220 The ongoing 
debate between person-first and identity-first language further highlights the 
critical impact language can have on identity and perception.221 
                                                                                                                           
 212 Id. 
 213 Simpson, supra note 1, at 14. 
 214 Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 258; Back et al., supra note 4, at 4–5. The American Psy-
chological Association endorsed person-first language as an effective way to shift public perception of 
people with disabilities towards acceptance and respect. Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 256. 
 215 Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 258. 
 216 See, e.g., Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017) (interpreting 
what constitutes a free and appropriate public education for a “disabled child”). The Court in Endrew 
F. held that a free and appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Act is one 
that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s 
circumstances.” Id. at 999. This means that schools should identify and work towards appropriately 
challenging objectives for every student with disabilities to ensure that these students benefit from 
their education. Id. at 992. What constitutes effective progress for students will vary depending on 
their particular levels of ability. Id. 
 217 Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 256. 
 218 Id. at 256–57. 
 219 Id. at 257. The National Federation for the Blind is one national organization that has decided 
to use identity-first language, rejecting person-first language as “overly defensive.” Id. 
 220 Galvin, supra note 13. 
 221 See Kanter, supra note 13, at 432–34 (highlighting the importance of language as promoting 
certain damaging ideas about disability and showcasing the ongoing debate between person-first and 
identity-first language). 
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS,  
STATE LEGISLATURES, AND THE SUPREME COURT  
REGARDING DISABILITY TERMINOLOGY 
Because the law can have important legal and social implications for peo-
ple with disabilities, the terminology utilized by practitioners, legislative bod-
ies, and courts should be consistent with modern views of disability.222 Section 
A of this Part recommends that lawyers utilize respectful disability terminolo-
gy as well as confront their own underlying assumptions about disability.223 
Section B recommends that state legislatures that have not modernized their 
legal terminology pass comprehensive legislation to rid their laws of stigmatiz-
ing language, and that states that have already done so ensure that the legislation 
is effectively enforced.224 Section C argues that the Supreme Court should 
broaden its interpretation of the definition of disability to better align with con-
gressional intent under the ADAAA and societal perceptions of disability.225 
A. Recommendations for Lawyers in Practice 
While federal legislation largely reflects person-first language and a so-
cial model of disability, it is much more difficult to measure whether the public 
perception of disability also reflects a social model.226 As described in Part II 
of this Note, the law can be a source of social exclusion, but it can also be a 
source of social change that is propelled by the enactment of progressive laws, 
inclusive judicial interpretation, and zealous attorney advocacy.227 Lawyers are 
often told that the law exists apart from moral, social, and cultural considera-
tions, but it can be incredibly powerful to examine the role that the law and 
lawyers have played in the societal marginalization of people with disabili-
ties.228 A lawyer holds a special role in society as both a “member of the legal 
profession . . . and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality 
of justice” as dictated by the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.229 As 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See id. at 432 (discussing the legal profession’s heavy reliance on oral and written advocacy 
that therefore leads the language in the law to have powerful consequences). 
 223 See infra notes 226–245 and accompanying text. 
 224 See infra notes 246–259 and accompanying text. 
 225 See infra notes 260–279 and accompanying text. 
 226 See Gustafson, supra note 187, at 1015 (describing that although it is easy to document the 
way the laws have changed and been utilized, it is more difficult to measure how the public’s percep-
tion of and resistance to disability rights have evolved). 
 227 Kanter, supra note 13, at 446; see supra notes 154–221 and accompanying text. 
 228 Kanter, supra note 13, at 446–48. For example, there is evidence that lawyers on both sides of 
Buck v. Bell participated in the case with the goal of upholding the sterilization laws. Verdict of Histo-
ry: The Forgotten Years: 1870–1940, supra note 44, at 12; see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927) 
(challenging the sterilization of a “feeble-minded” woman under Virginia’s mandatory sterilization 
laws).  
 229 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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private citizens, lawyers will either experience disability directly at some point 
in their lifetime or know someone with a disability.230 There is the same risk 
for lawyers as there is for the rest of society that their biases and assumptions 
reflect the prejudices or misapprehensions about disability outlined in Part I 
and Part II of this Note.231 As members of the legal profession, lawyers come 
face-to-face with disability in countless areas of the law, including: guardian-
ship, insanity defenses in criminal law, insurance law, competency determina-
tions, custody decisions, education law, employment discrimination, constitu-
tional considerations of equal protection and sovereign immunity, family law, 
and more.232 As representatives, most lawyers will have a client with a disabil-
ity at some point during their career.233 
It is therefore critically important for lawyers to examine their own biases 
and learn best practices for representing clients with disabilities in order to be 
agents for social change.234 Lawyers must challenge their underlying assump-
tions about people with disabilities in order to provide the best representation 
possible.235 If a lawyer has internalized an equation of disability with incompe-
                                                                                                                           
 230 Kanter, supra note 13, at 449. When the ADA was passed in 1990, the statement of findings 
and purposes stated that upwards of forty-three million Americans have one or more disabilities, and 
that this number will only increase as the population gets older. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2018). Disabil-
ity is often considered the largest minority in the country. Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 259. 
 231 See Kanter, supra note 13, at 468 (discussing how lawyers might possess damaging biases 
towards people with disabilities); supra notes 24–152, 171–186 and accompanying text. 
 232 Kanter, supra note 13, at 461–68. Lawyers have a special responsibility to be informed about 
the legal ramifications of disability to ensure that people with disabilities receive proper treatment 
under the law. WOODY, supra note 42, at 4. They are assisted in this role by individuals in other pro-
fessions who also interact with the law, including social workers, educators, and law enforcement. Id. 
 233 Kanter, supra note 13, at 469. 
 234 Id. at 468–69. It is not only clients with disabilities who suffer from damaging stereotypes 
about disabilities, but also lawyers with disabilities. Donald H. Stone, The Disabled Lawyers Have 
Arrived; Have They Been Welcomed with Open Arms into the Profession? An Empirical Study of the 
Disabled Lawyer, 27 LAW & INEQ. 93, 99 (2009). Studies by the National Association of Law Place-
ment found that there are great disparities both in hiring rates and pay scales between lawyers with 
disabilities and those without. Id. at 95. A California poll found that lawyers with disabilities reported 
experiencing skepticism about their professional capabilities, derogatory comments from judges, em-
ployer refusals to provide accommodation, physical and communication barriers, and various other 
forms of discrimination. Id. at 98–99. 
 235 Kanter, supra note 13, at 468. Kanter recommends exposure to clients with disabilities and the 
field of disability studies during law school as one way to ensure that lawyers are properly trained in 
representing clients with disabilities respectfully and effectively. Id. at 466–77. First year courses such 
as Torts, Criminal Law, Property, and Constitutional Law often touch on issues related to disability, 
but disability should be explicitly addressed and discussed as part of the curriculum. Id. at 466. Stu-
dents will be exposed to disability by discussing, for example, what it means to be a reasonable person 
with a disability, considering modifications required by the ADA for places of public accommodation, 
and toying with complex areas of constitutional law such as equal protection that have been brought 
up by cases related to disability. Id. Disability pervades upper level courses as well, including Evi-
dence and issues of testimony, Estate Tax and estate planning for parents of children with disabilities, 
Employment Law and providing accommodations for employees with disabilities, and more. Id. at 
467. Furthermore, Kanter recommends schools provide disability-related clinics to help students de-
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tence, it may lead them to substitute their own expertise for the express wishes 
of their client, contrary to their professional duty.236 Lawyers also must under-
stand the complex ways disability is treated by the law and have the ability to 
separate the legal construction from the social construction of disability.237 For 
example, a client who has been deemed incompetent in court may still be fully 
competent to make her own decisions relating to her representation.238 
Lawyers are charged with improving the law and legal profession and 
working to ensure equal access to the legal system for all.239 Utilizing the pre-
ferred language of clients with disabilities is one relatively simple way a lawyer 
can respect the autonomy and identity of their clients.240 A lawyer is a repre-
sentative, advocate, and voice of their client.241 Lawyers should ask their clients 
what language choices they prefer and respect those wishes whenever referring 
to their client’s disability is appropriate, including in interviews, briefs, and ar-
guments in court.242 The language a lawyer uses in briefs and arguments could 
ultimately be memorialized in a judicial opinion, which in turn can influence the 
                                                                                                                           
velop the professional skills necessary to work with clients with disabilities. Id. at 474. These oppor-
tunities will present law students with an opportunity to confront their own assumptions about and 
biases towards people with disabilities. Id. Doing so will not only make them better communicators 
and advocates for all their future clients, but also give them an opportunity to confront the way socie-
ty, and the law, is often inaccessible to people with disabilities. Id. at 475–77. Able-bodied law stu-
dents often represent society’s view of what is “normal,” and working with individuals who are differ-
ent from themselves can help them understand that what constitutes the norm is often a social con-
struct. Id. at 476. It will also expose them to the fact that people with disabilities are a heterogeneous 
group and that every client comes with their own unique characteristics, of which disability may just 
be one. Id. 
 236 Id. at 468; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (mandating that a lawyer will follow 
a client’s wishes when it comes to the objectives of their representation, and stating that although 
lawyers have control over the procedure, they should consult with the client as to the methods they 
will use). Even though clients are meant to control the objectives of their legal representation, the 
reality is that lawyers often make these decisions, and that risk is particularly prevalent when working 
with clients with disabilities. See SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS 
OF DISABLED PERSONS 140 (1984) (discussing how the line between a lawyer suggesting a course of 
action and choosing to pursue it is often blurred). 
 237 Kanter, supra note 13, at 468–69. 
 238 Id. There are several factors that can influence how successful the lawyer-client relationship is 
in the disability context, including demographics, psychology, and economics. OLSON, supra note 
236, at 131–32. Lawyers should consciously make sure their clients feel empowered to make their 
own decisions. Id. at 137. 
 239 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 6. 
 240 Cf. Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 261 (suggesting that professionals like psychologists 
should ask people how they prefer to be referred to and should explore the social, political, and cultur-
al reasons for different language preferences to gain a deeper understanding of their clients). 
 241 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 2. 
 242 Cf. Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 262 (advising psychologists to understand and become 
comfortable both with person-first and identity-first language to best respect the wishes of their cli-
ents). 
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future of both the law and societal perception.243 The American Bar Association 
has a disability rights section of its website that addresses issues of accessibility, 
but a language guide that articulates best practices for lawyers who work with 
clients with disabilities would also be beneficial for lawyers to reference.244 Such 
resources will assist lawyers in promoting a social model of disability simply by 
being careful and intentional about the disability language they use.245 
B. Recommendations for State Legislatures 
Rosa’s Law was a direct federal legislative condemnation of the use of 
demeaning language and a mandate to replace it with language that connotes 
equality and inclusion.246 In the years following its passage, many states 
passed similar statutes modernizing the terminology used in their laws to refer 
to people with disabilities.247 The statute passed in Nevada, for example, spe-
cifically orders the Legislative Counsel to use respectful language and sen-
tence structures that refer to the person first, then the disability.248 Colorado 
passed a session law in 2018 mandating the removal of the outdated term 
“mental retardation” from all state laws.249 In 2019, Wisconsin’s governor 
signed a bill removing the term from the state’s administrative code.250  
                                                                                                                           
 243 See CHAMBLISS & SEIDMAN, supra note 13, at 35 (describing the power of the judiciary as a 
norm-enforcing institution). 
 244 See Commission on Disability Rights, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
diversity/disabilityrights/ [https://perma.cc/UL2T-J7LA] (containing links to numerous accessibility 
resources but not including a language guide for lawyers). 
 245 See Kanter, supra note 13, at 432 (discussing how language is an important tool for the prac-
tice of law and asserting that lawyers therefore need to understand the power of the words they use, 
particularly when it comes to disability). 
 246 See Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643, 2643 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (mandating the use of person-first language throughout federal law); 
S. REP. NO. 111-244, at 3 (2009) (finding that language needs to reflect the goals of equality and in-
clusion of individuals with disabilities throughout society). 
 247 Ford et al., supra note 12, at 111; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-210d (2019) (mandating 
the replacement of “the mentally retarded” with “persons with intellectual disability” and other similar 
changes in Connecticut statutes). 
 248 NEV. REV. STAT. § 220.125(1) (2019). The Nevada statute goes on to state that person-first 
language is preferred for use throughout Nevada laws and that “handicapped,” “mentally retarded,” 
and other similar words are no longer preferred. Id. § 220.125(2)–(3). 
 249 See 2018 Colo. Legis. Serv. ch. 44 (S.B. 18-096) (West) (mandating the modernization of “the 
outdated use of the terms ‘mental retardation’ and ‘mentally retarded’” in Colorado laws). This law 
does not go far enough, however: the legislation did not remove the terms but rather added in an addi-
tional alternate label. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1102(1) (2019) (“Any defendant may file 
a motion with the trial court in which the defendant may allege that such defendant is a mentally re-
tarded defendant or a defendant with an intellectual and developmental disability.”) (emphasis added). 
250 Riley Vetterkind, Tony Evers’ First Bill-Signing Removes ‘R-Word’ from Administrative 
Code, WIS. ST. J. (May 2, 2019), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/tony-evers-
first-bill-signing-removes-r-word-from-administrative/article_a5f3d1ae-3e47-5268-99ca-
f0ab969445dd.html [https://perma.cc/C73T-L3BC]; see S.B. 19, 104th Legis. Sess. (Wis. 2019) (re-
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Not every state followed suit, however.251 State legislatures that have not 
introduced such bills or have had bills fail before being enacted should renew 
efforts to pass such a law.252 All states should also conduct a comprehensive 
examination to remove all stigmatizing language regarding disability in bills 
that have already been passed.253 As discussed in Part II of this Note, public 
policy and law can either maintain the status quo, often at the expense of mi-
nority groups, or can actively combat damaging social attitudes and discrimi-
nation; changing language is one seemingly simple, yet impactful, way to do 
so.254 Federal and state laws and regulations should utilize consistent terminol-
ogy to ensure coherence and uniformity.255 
One of the consistent problems with disability terminology throughout 
history is that it often was not chosen by the individuals it is meant to describe, 
but rather was imposed onto them by others.256 As a result, such language does 
not reflect their personal identities or the way they wish to be viewed by socie-
ty.257 One simple way a legislature can institutionalize respect for people with 
disabilities is to make sure their preferred language is always utilized in state 
laws.258 Especially given the growing preference for identity-first language, 
                                                                                                                           
placing the term “mental retardation” with “intellectual disabilities” in Wisconsin’s administrative 
code). 
 251 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 56 § 530.6 (2019) (granting the Oklahoma Department of Human 
Services the authority to investigate homes that care for “mentally retarded” or “developmentally 
disabled” adults). 
 252 See Ford et al., supra note 12, at 111 (discussing how all states should strive to rid their laws 
of stigmatizing language and replace it with more inclusive terminology); Marie Szaniszlo, Bill to 
Strike the ‘R Word’ from Bay State Laws Languishes in Committee, BOS. HERALD (Nov. 21, 2019), 
https://www.bostonherald.com/2019/11/21/bill-to-strike-the-r-word-from-bay-state-laws-languishes-
in-committee/ [https://perma.cc/FY4H-7YNF] (discussing how a bill filed in Massachusetts in 2011—
and every year since—proposing the removal of “retarded” from the general laws has not been able to 
make it out of committee). Patricia Jehlen, the state senator who proposed the Massachusetts bill, 
posited that the reason it has not moved forward is “that there’s no giant movement behind it.” Sza-
niszlo, supra. 
 253 See Ford et al., supra note 12, at 111 (emphasizing how important consistency is across state 
laws). 
 254 See S. REP. NO. 111-244, at 3 (2010) (stating that the law should mirror the societal departure 
from the term “mentally retarded” in favor of language that better reflects the current perception of 
people with disabilities as equal members of society); CHAMBLISS & SEIDMAN, supra note 13, at 35 
(describing how law and policy have the power to define the norms of society); Kanter, supra note 13, 
at 432, 446 (discussing the importance of language in the law and how the law can both promote ex-
clusion and foster inclusion depending on how it is utilized); supra notes 160–209 and accompanying 
text. 
 255 See Ford et al., supra note 12, at 108 (emphasizing that federal and state laws and programs 
should consistently reflect the shift to more inclusive language). 
 256 Galvin, supra note 13. Fred Pelka states that even this idea—that individuals with disabilities 
could determine for themselves their own identity—is revolutionary given the fact that such an identi-
ty has been imposed upon them by other forces in society for all of history. PELKA, supra note 8, at 4. 
 257 Galvin, supra note 13. 
 258 See Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 261 (explaining that the best way for psychologists to 
resolve the tension around disability terminology is to simply ask the individuals they work with what 
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particularly among the Deaf, blind, and autistic communities, state legislatures 
should consult with disability rights groups in their jurisdiction when updating 
legislative language.259 
C. Broadening the Definition of Disability Under the ADA 
Once the legislature changes its language and policies to reflect a social 
model of disability and inclusion, courts are tasked with interpreting and ap-
plying that terminology.260 As described in Part II of this Note, these interpre-
tations can have drastic implications for individual and group rights.261 While 
the ADA was seen as a groundbreaking piece of legislation that targeted both 
physical barriers and social stigma, it did not provide sufficient guidance to 
courts on how to navigate the social model and its emphasis on remedying so-
cietal discrimination.262 Disability is a class that individuals can move in and 
out of as well as experience in vastly different ways depending on their partic-
ular condition, so developing clear definitions can be difficult.263 The Supreme 
Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. and subsequent cases therefore uti-
lized a formalist interpretation of “disability” that mirrored the medical mod-
el’s focus on the individual’s condition in order to determine who is eligible 
for protection under the ADA.264 This interpretation, however, is contrary to 
the purpose and legislative history of the definition of disability and the law 
                                                                                                                           
terminology they prefer); Ford et al., supra note 12, at 111 (discussing how all states should strive for 
consistent use of respectful statutory language). 
 259 See Dunn & Andrews, supra note 7, at 257, 262 (discussing how the National Federation of 
the Blind has elected to use identity-first language, and that many Deaf and autistic individuals simi-
larly prefer identity-first language); Back et al., supra note 4, at 5 (describing that individuals who 
prefer identity-first language feel that disability is a crucial part of who they are rather than a medical 
flaw). 
 260 Gustafson, supra note 187, at 1026–27. 
 261 See Perju, supra note 7, at 315 (describing the judicial narrowing of the statutory definition of 
“individual with a disability” under the ADA and its implications for eligibility under the law); supra 
notes 160–209 and accompanying text. 
 262 Perju, supra note 7, at 323. 
 263 Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 405–06; Gustafson, supra note 187, at 1022–23. Sometimes disa-
bility is referred to as an “open minority,” because injury, illness, or even age can lead someone to 
become disabled at any point in their life. PELKA, supra note 8, at 25–26. There is also such a wide 
variety of disabilities that affect people from all walks of life that individuals who are part of the disa-
bility community may see themselves as having little in common with others in the same community. 
Id. 
 264 Perju, supra note 7, at 320, 332; see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481 (1999) 
(holding that plaintiffs with severe vision impairments did not meet the definition of disability be-
cause the fact that they wore corrective lenses prevented them from qualifying under the “substantially 
limited in any major life activity” prong). This response has been described as the judiciary’s negative 
reaction to the social model of the ADA, which was enacted before the public had fully embraced the 
goal of inclusion of individuals with disabilities codified in the law. Perju, supra note 7, at 323. Judg-
es are also often uncomfortable with an idea of positive discrimination or affirmative action through 
which certain individuals are granted accommodations and services that others are not. Id. 
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itself.265 It is also incongruous with the fact that often, the main unifying expe-
rience individuals with disabilities share is that they are societally perceived as 
having a disability, whether or not they actually identify as such.266 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation means that individuals who view 
themselves and are viewed by society as having a disability, such as someone 
who is completely blind in one eye, may be told by a judge that they do not 
legally qualify as “disabled.”267 Plaintiffs carry a heavy and uncomfortable 
burden of proving that they are “substantially limited” even though the ADA is 
meant to legitimize the idea that people with disabilities can be autonomous 
and self-sufficient when provided with proper accommodations and ser-
vices.268 It also means that the court often does not eventually address the 
question of discrimination that the ADA is meant to target.269 This resets the 
status quo by excluding individuals from the public and private institutions the 
ADA intended to make available for all.270 Although such exclusion may be 
more easily justified by the Court when it comes to individuals with vision 
problems who cannot be airline pilots or truck drivers, it is much harder to 
stomach when it prevents those same plaintiffs from bringing a case when they 
experience outright discrimination or animosity as a result of their disability.271 
The ADA was ahead of its time in promoting a social model of disability, 
and the view of disability has only evolved in society and popular culture since 
then; the Supreme Court’s interpretation of disability should better align with 
                                                                                                                           
 265 Perju, supra note 7, at 320. 
 266 See Kanter, supra note 13, at 435 (discussing how disability encompasses individuals with a 
wide variety of experiences and perspectives whose one unifying feature is that society has deemed 
them as outside the norm). 
 267 See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999) (holding that the brain’s 
accounting for a loss of vision in one eye disqualifies plaintiff from protection under the ADA because 
he is not “substantially limited” in any way); Gustafson, supra note 187, at 1013 (describing how the 
definition of disability is incongruous between public perception, the ADA, and the Supreme Court). 
 268 Emens, supra note 152, at 216–17; see Perju, supra note 7, at 315 (describing how difficult the 
Supreme Court has made it for plaintiffs to get over the hurdle of qualifying as an individual with a 
disability). Emens describes how it is both difficult and uncomfortable for a plaintiff to prove that they 
are “substantially limited” yet “otherwise qualified” as an employee. Emens, supra note 152, at 216–
17. 
 269 See Perju, supra note 7, at 316 (describing how judicial attention on the definition of disability 
has prevented courts from addressing and answering questions of disability-based discrimination). 
 270 Gustafson, supra note 187, at 1026. 
 271 See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481 (rejecting plaintiffs’ contention that being denied positions as 
airline pilots because of a vision requirement was disability-based discrimination because they were 
not individuals with a disability); Albertson’s, Inc., 527 U.S. at 565–66 (holding that plaintiff who was 
blind in one eye could not sue for discrimination after being denied a position as a truck driver be-
cause he could not show that he experienced a substantial limitation due to his brain’s ability to miti-
gate for his monocular vision); Gustafson, supra note 187, at 1028 (describing the Supreme Court’s 
narrowing of the definition of disability as preventing individuals who have minor impairments but 
experience substantial disability-based discrimination and animus from any recovery under the ADA). 
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this progression.272 The Supreme Court’s formalist interpretation is described 
as a straightforward creation of standards that are easy to apply to a variety of 
scenarios and takes the morality of a realist interpretation out of the inquiry.273 
Deciding who qualifies as an individual with a disability, however, is essential-
ly a judgment based on subjective values.274 The Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion sends a message that despite what the ADA says, disability comes from an 
individual, not society.275 One way to better comport with the goals of inclu-
sion is to follow Congress’s directive in the Amendments to the ADA to inter-
pret the definition of disability broadly and ascribe to a more realist view of 
people with disability as those who experience exclusion due to physical and 
societal barriers.276 This interpretation would shift the bulk of ADA inquiry to 
the question of discrimination.277 The outcome of cases like Sutton may still be 
the same, but at the very least there would be more consistency between the 
social, legislative, and judicial interpretations of what it means to have a disa-
bility.278 This would not only judicially affirm the social model of disability, 
but it may also lead to further improvement in societal perception by bringing 
more people into the workplace and giving society more exposure to people 
with a wide range of disabilities and accommodations.279 
                                                                                                                           
 272 See Emens, supra note 152, at 206–07 (describing how the ADA was enacted before society 
had fully accepted people with disabilities, and how that led judges to narrow its application to com-
port with their own views of disability). 
 273 Perju, supra note 7, at 283. Courts are often concerned with creating clear and rational lines of 
inquiry without regard for the political or social consequences. Id. at 343–44. 
 274 Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 412–13. 
 275 See Perju, supra note 7, at 344 (describing how the courts reverted to a medical model of disa-
bility either due to a misunderstanding of or an outright rejection of the purpose of the ADA to target 
societal barriers to inclusion). The Court focused on the nature, severity, duration, and impact of the 
plaintiff’s “impairment” but never the social effects or exclusion the plaintiff experienced. Id. at 316. 
 276 Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 445–46; see Emens, supra note 152, at 207 (expressing doubts that 
the Supreme Court will be willing to embrace a social model of disability and broaden the definition). 
 277 Perju, supra note 7, at 316; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (instructing courts to interpret the defini-
tion of disability broadly in order to cover a greater number of individuals); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 494 
(dismissing plaintiff’s claim without addressing the question of whether a vision requirement consti-
tutes discrimination under the ADA). 
 278 See Gustafson, supra note 187, at 1013 (highlighting the discrepancies between definitions of 
disability across different institutions); see, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 46 (2003) 
(highlighting that in order to qualify for relief under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that they were 
discriminated against because of that disability). 
 279 See DISABILITY IN AMERICA: TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR PREVENTION 36 (Andrew 
M. Pope & Alvin R. Tarlov eds., 1991) (discussing how a complete understanding of disability must 
include consideration of the limiting effect of the environment and public attitudes); Bagenstos, supra 
note 7, at 444 (postulating that disability is a socially defined status that views certain individuals as 
outside the “norm”); Emens, supra note 152, at 209 (stating that a broadened interpretation under the 
ADAAA could have a circular effect by positively impacting attitudes about disability as more people 
are brought into the workforce). 
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CONCLUSION 
The terminology used to discuss disability has changed significantly 
throughout history. These changes often mirrored the way society’s percep-
tions of disability have evolved: from “feeble-minded” and the medical model 
of disability as a problem to be cured, to person-first language and the social 
model that considers societal discrimination to be at the very core of what it 
means to have a disability. The law has played an underlying role in every one 
of these changes, sometimes codifying damaging labels and perceptions while 
at other times leading the charge for more inclusive terminology and treatment. 
The law as an institution has the power to normalize damaging stereotypes and 
maintain oppressive power structures, or it can actively combat discrimination. 
Because language is a powerful tool used in every area of the institution of 
law, it is important to understand the history and impacts of the words we 
choose to use. To align with the disability rights movement and the preferences 
of disability advocates, the terminology used by legal practitioners, state stat-
utes, and the Supreme Court should reflect the social model of disability. Law-
yers should do their part as public citizens with the special duty of promoting 
justice by respecting the wishes of their clients when it comes to what termi-
nology they prefer. State legislatures should survey their laws and ensure that 
no stigmatizing statutory language remains. Finally, the Supreme Court should 
pursue the policy of the ADA to combat discrimination and follow the con-
gressional mandate in the ADAAA by employing a broad definition of disabil-
ity that considers societal perceptions and treatment of individuals with disa-
bilities, thus giving the Court an opportunity to address the discrimination the 
ADA was intended to combat. 
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